1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA		
2	DONALD J. TRUMP FOR :		
3	PRESIDENT, INC., et al., : Civil Action Plaintiffs : No. 4:20-CV-02078		
4	:		
5	vs. : (Judge Brann)		
6	KATHY BOOCKVAR, et al.,  Defendants:		
7	NAACP-PENNSYLVANIA STATE :		
8	CONFERENCE, et al., : Intervenor Defendants :		
9	DNC SERVICES CORPORATION/ : DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,:		
10	Intervenor Defendant :		
11			
12	TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT PROCEEDINGS		
13	IN RE: MOTION TO DISMISS		
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW W. BRANN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
15	NOVEMBER 17, 2020; 1:30 P.M. WILLIAMSPORT, PENNSYLVANIA		
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21	Lori A. Shuey		
22	Federal Certified Realtime Reporter United States Courthouse		
23	228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 983 Harrisburg, PA 17108-0983		
24	717-215-1270 lori shuey@pamd.uscourts.gov		
25	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.		

## **APPEARANCES** 1 2 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS: 3 Rudolph W. Giuliani, Esquire Giuliani Partners, LLC 4 445 Park Avenue, 18th Floor New York, NY 10022 5 6 Linda A. Kerns, Esquire Law Offices of Linda A. Kerns, LLC 7 1420 Locust Street, Suite 200 Philadelphia, PA 19102 8 Marc A. Scaringi, Esquire 9 Brian C. Caffrey, Esquire Scaringi Law 2000 Linglestown Road, Suite 106 10 Harrisburg, PA 17110 11 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATHY BOOCKVAR: 12 Daniel T. Donovan, Esquire 13 Michael A. Glick, Esquire Kirkland & Ellis, LLP 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 14 Washington, D.C. 20004 15 Daniel T. Brier, Esquire Myers, Brier & Kelly, LLP 16 425 Spruce Street, Suite 200 17 Scranton, PA 18503 Keli M. Neary, Exec. Deputy Attorney General (via Webex) 18 Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General 19 Civil Law Division Strawberry Square, 15th Floor 20 Harrisburg, PA 17120 21 22 23 24 25

## APPEARANCES (cont'd.) 1 2 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS ALLEGHENY, CHESTER, MONTGOMERY & 3 PHILADELPHIA COUNTIES: Mark A. Aronchick, Esquire (via Webex) 4 Michele D. Hangley, Esquire Hangley, Aronchick, Segal, Pudlin & Schiller 5 One Logan Square, 27th Floor 6 Philadelphia, PA 19103 7 Andrew F. Szefi, Esquire (via Webex) Allegheny County Law Department 445 Fort Pitt Boulevard, Suite 300 8 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 9 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT CENTRE COUNTY: 10 Elizabeth A. Dupuis, Esquire Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir, P.C. 11 330 Innovation Boulevard, Suite 302 State College, PA 16803 12 13 Molly E. Meacham, Esquire Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir, P.C. Two Gateway Center 14 603 Stanwix Street, 6th Floor 15 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT DELAWARE COUNTY: 16 17 Terence M. Grugan, Esquire Edward D. Rogers, Esquire (via Webex) Ballard Spahr, LLP 18 1735 Market Street, 51st Floor 19 Philadelphia, PA 19103 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT NORTHAMPTON COUNTY: 20 21 Timothy P. Brennan, Esquire (via Webex) County of Northampton 669 Washington Street 22 Easton, PA 18042 23 Brian J. Taylor, Esquire (via Webex) 24 King, Spry, Herman, Freund & Faul, LLC One West Broad Street, Suite 700 25 Bethlehem, PA 18018

## APPEARANCES (cont'd.) 1 2 COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS NAACP-PSC, COMMON CAUSE PA, 3 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF PA, BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT PROJECT, GAJDA, HIGGINS, LARA, MORALES, PRICE, STOVER, AYENI & 4 STEVENS: 5 Witold J. Walczak, Esquire American Civil Liberties Union of PA 6 P.O. Box 23058 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 7 David M. Zionts, Esquire Covington & Burling, LLP 8 One City Center 9 850 Tenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 10 Benjamin D. Geffen, Esquire The Public Interest Law Center 11 2 Penn Center 1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 802 12 Philadelphia, PA 19102 13 COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR DEFENDANT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE: 14 Uzoma Nkwonta, Esquire 15 Marc E. Elias, Esquire Perkins Coie, LLP 700 13th Street, N.W., Suite 600 16 Washington, D.C. 20005 17 Clifford B. Levine, Esquire Dentons, Cohen & Grigsby, P.C. 18 625 Liberty Avenue, 5th Floor 19 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 20 Ari Holtzblatt, Esquire Seth P. Waxman, Esquire (via Webex) 21 Wilmer Hale 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 22 23 24 25

1	INDEX	
2		
3		PAGE
4	Argument by Mr. Giuliani	14
5	Argument By Mr. Donovan	33
6	Argument By Mr. Aronchick	66
7	Argument by Ms. Dupuis	93
8	Argument By Mr. Nkwonta	95
9	Argument By Mr. Zionts	100
10	Questions by The Court	106
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The matter before the court this afternoon THE COURT: is that of Donald J. Trump for President, Incorporated, at al., against Kathy Boockvar, et al., docketed in this court at Civil Number 4:20-CV-2078. I have the list of the many counsel present, but just to confirm this for the court, we'll start with plaintiffs' counsel, if you could identify yourselves for the record, please. Mr. Giuliani, we'll start with you. MR. GIULIANI: Rudolph W. Giuliani. I represent the plaintiffs in this case but need to be admitted pro hac vice with Your Honor's permission. COURTROOM DEPUTY: It's been done. THE COURT: My staff confirms that's done. MR. GIULIANI: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're a member of the bar of New York? MR. GIULIANI: I am, yes, sir. THE COURT: And at least one federal court? MR. GIULIANI: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You're good to go. MR. GIULIANI: May I take this off when I speak? THE COURT: Well, that's your choice. I have mine off because I'm doing some speaking, and it's easiest for me to hear and I think it's easiest for the court reporter to hear if you take your mask off when you're speaking. MR. GIULIANI: It also doesn't fog up my glasses.

```
THE COURT: Well, that's the same -- I have the same
 1
     issue, so I understand that. All right. Is this Ms. Kerns?
 2
 3
              MS. KERNS: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Identify yourself, please.
 4
 5
              MS. KERNS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Linda Kerns,
 6
     K-e-r-n-s, for the plaintiffs, Donald J. Trump for President,
 7
     Incorporated, David Henry, and Lawrence Roberts.
              THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. Mr. Scaringi.
 8
 9
              MR. SCARINGI: Yes, good afternoon, Your Honor. Marc
     Scaringi from my law firm Scaringi Law for the plaintiffs.
10
              THE COURT: Very good. And?
11
              MR. CAFFREY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian C.
12
     Caffrey from Scaringi Law for the plaintiffs.
13
14
              THE COURT: Very good. Anyone else here for the
15
     plaintiffs? All right. Thank you. Mr. Donovan.
16
              MR. DONOVAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Daniel
17
     Donovan for the Secretary, Kathy Boockvar.
18
              THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Brier.
19
              MR. BRIER: Yes, good afternoon, Your Honor.
20
     Brier on behalf of the Secretary, as well.
              THE COURT: Thank you. And you're Mr. --
21
22
              MR. GLICK: Glick, Michael Glick on behalf of
     Secretary Boockvar.
23
24
              THE COURT: Are you with Kirkland and Ellis?
25
              MR. GLICK: I am, Your Honor.
```

```
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. And then in the next row
1
2
     back, it's not Mr. Rogers. I think it's Mr. Rogers' partner.
3
     Is that right?
              MR. GRUGAN: That's right, Your Honor.
4
              THE COURT: And you are?
5
 6
              MR. GRUGAN: Terence Grugan here for Delaware County.
7
              THE COURT: Right. You're with Ballard Spahr?
              MR. GRUGAN: Yes, sir.
8
9
              THE COURT: Very good, sir. And next to you?
              MS. HANGLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michele
10
     Hangley from Hangley, Aronchick, Segal, Pudlin and Schiller for
11
     Allegheny, Chester, Montgomery, and Philadelphia Counties.
12
              THE COURT: And Mr. Aronchick, I think, is with us
13
     virtually. Is that right, Mr. Aronchick?
14
15
              MR. ARONCHICK: Yes, it is. I am here for the same
16
     clients. Thank you.
17
              THE COURT: Very good, sir. Thank you. And who is
     behind you, the next gentleman? Yes, you, sir.
18
19
              MR. NKWONTA: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Uzoma
20
     Nkwonta from Perkins Coie on behalf of the DNC.
21
              THE COURT: Thank you, sir. And to your left?
              MR. HOLTZBLATT: Ari Holtzblatt of the firm Wilmer
22
     Hale on behalf of the DNC, Your Honor.
23
24
              THE COURT: Thank you. Next gentleman.
25
              MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, Clifford Levine. I'm here
```

```
for the DNC, Dentons, Cohen and Grigsby.
1
2
              THE COURT: Right. Very good, sir. And then behind
3
     you, Mr. Walczak.
              MR. WALCZAK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Wit Walczak
4
     from the ACLU of Pennsylvania on behalf of NAACP, Common Cause
5
 6
     Pennsylvania, League of Women Voters Pennsylvania, Black
7
     Political Empowerment Project, and individual intervenors.
              THE COURT: Thank you, sir. And to your left?
8
9
     Mr. Geffen, isn't it? All right.
              MR. GEFFEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Benjamin
10
     Geffen from the Public Interest Law Center in Philadelphia on
11
12
     behalf of the same voter intervenors.
13
                          Thank you. And to your left?
              THE COURT:
              MR. ZIONTS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Zionts
14
15
     from Covington and Burling on behalf of the voter intervenors.
              THE COURT: Thank you. And then I think in the back,
16
17
     is it Ms. Dupuis?
18
              MS. DUPUIS: Yes, Your Honor, on behalf of Centre
19
     County, and I believe my partner, Molly Meacham, is also on the
20
             Thank you.
     phone.
21
              THE COURT: Ms. Meacham, you're with us virtually?
              MS. MEACHAM: That's correct, Your Honor.
22
23
              THE COURT: Or telephonically.
24
              MS. MEACHAM: Yes, Your Honor.
25
              THE COURT: One way or the other, I quess. Oh, you're
```

1 here. Very good, Ms. Meacham. Thank you. Is there anyone else who is here -- we have some people in the back who I don't 2 know. Who are these other individuals in the back? Are you 3 4 presenting or just dropped by? MR. MARKS: Your Honor, my name is Bruce Marks. I 5 6 have not formally been engaged by the plaintiffs yet, but I 7 have been assisting in the preparation. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 8 9 MR. MARKS: I'm an attorney. THE COURT: Yes, I'm familiar with you, Mr. Marks, at 10 11 least by reputation. Anyone else? 12 MR. EPSHTEYN: Your Honor, Boris Epshteyn with the 13 Trump Campaign as an adviser, not as an attorney. 14 THE COURT: All right. Is there anyone else here, 15 whether you're an attorney or not, who is going to be presenting on behalf of either the plaintiffs or any of the 16 17 defendants who would want to be identified for the record? 18 My court reporter, Ms. Shuey, probably would appreciate receiving business cards from any of you at the 19 20 conclusion of our argument today just for the purpose of 21 getting spellings of names, firms, et cetera, who you're with. 22 And to the extent that a transcript would later need to be produced, you can make those arrangements with her. 23 24 So before you depart the premises -- she will have, of 25 course, the docket sheet, but I think there are some -- maybe

some late arrivals who may not be immediately on the docket sheet. It would be beneficial at the conclusion of the hearing if you'd just pause a moment. She would appreciate that, I think. Would you not, Lori? She says she would. All right.

So we're here to conduct an oral argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss that was filed on both November 15 and November 16, 2020.

Before we begin, I need some clarification, I think, as to how the defendants would like to proceed. It's the court's preference that the attorney or attorneys for one of the defendants present the general defense on behalf of all defendants, and then, if it is necessary, attorneys for the remaining defendants may raise any factual or legal issues that are specific as to that particular defendant.

Do we agree, defense counsel, that would be the best way to proceed? Mr. Donovan?

MR. DONOVAN: Yes. Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm going to take the lead and present the arguments, Mr. Aronchick is going to do abstention, and then if any other lawyers have any other points, we've tried to coordinate that.

THE COURT: Right, I assumed you did. And we'll do a little round robin then at the end of that --

MR. DONOVAN: That's great.

THE COURT: -- to make sure everyone, everyone's been acknowledged. Don't feel the need to speak if it's been

covered. All right. So I don't think I need an opening statement, but I'll give you the opportunity to make one. I've read everything that has -- I've read everything that's been docketed.

There are a couple of ministerial, what I would describe as ministerial issues that I want to take up at the end. You can reasonably anticipate what those issues would be.

I'm really here for the main event and -- primarily.

So let me just make sure, before I get opening statements, if counsel wish to provide them, to clarify a few items to make sure that we're all on the same page. I think we are or can be.

The plaintiffs' amended complaint, which was filed this past Sunday, November 15, 2020, has essentially removed several counts from the plaintiffs' original complaint. As I understand now, the only two remaining counts are for alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Elections and Electors Clause.

Am I correct? Who would like to speak for the plaintiffs on that point? Mr. Mayor?

MR. GIULIANI: I would, Your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GIULIANI: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And do the plaintiffs agree that after the United States Court of Appeals

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

for the Third Circuit's opinion at the end of last week in the matter of Bognet versus the Secretary of the Commonwealth, that the plaintiffs cannot assert standing in this circuit to raise their Elections and Electors Clause claims? MR. GIULIANI: Yes, Your Honor. The only clarification is that we are going to seek leave, we've already prepared it, to amend this complaint to restore our due process claim, which we think was mistakenly removed. THE COURT: Well --MR. GIULIANI: But we're not -- but we are withdrawing -- we're preserving for appeal the Elector and the Elections Clause, but we will not be proceeding on that. THE COURT: All right. Well, that is one of the --I'm going to describe as ministerial issues that I'd like to talk about --MR. GIULIANI: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- at the end of the oral argument. MR. GIULIANI: Thank you. THE COURT: I'm going to circle back to you then. Remind me of that. I assumed that was an issue. We'll attend to that issue about a further amendment of the complaint at that point. MR. GIULIANI: Thank you. THE COURT: All right. So the only outstanding claim really before this court at this point is the equal protection

claim. Do you agree? 1 MR. GIULIANI: Right now, Your Honor, yes. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Donovan, speaking for your collective 3 defendants, do you think you'd agree? 4 MR. DONOVAN: Agree, Your Honor. 5 6 MR. GIULIANI: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. The plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, so I'll ask them to present first. Mr. Giuliani, go 8 9 right ahead. MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, would you like me to remain 10 11 here or there? 12 THE COURT: Is it easiest for counsel to speak at counsel table? 13 14 MR. GIULIANI: Sure, either way. 15 THE COURT: That's fine with me. MR. DONOVAN: That's fine, Your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: If you need to use the podium, you're certainly welcome to do that. We've just found in the course 18 19 of this pandemic that many times the attorneys prefer to just remain seated at counsel table. It's not my general 20 21 preference, but I understand. And so if you'd like to speak and it's easier for you to do that, stay right at counsel 22 tables. 23 24 MR. GIULIANI: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please 25 the court, my name is Rudolph Giuliani, and I'm here on behalf

of the plaintiffs. I thank the court very much for allowing me to be admitted pro hac vice.

Your Honor, the best description of what we're alleging -- and, again, on a motion to dismiss, our allegations have to be deemed to be accurate and true. Of course, that's subject to testing during the hearing. But the best description of this situation is, it's widespread, nationwide voter fraud of which this is a part. And that's probably the reason I'm here, Your Honor, because this is not an isolated case, it's a case that is repeated in at least ten other jurisdictions.

It seems to me, in the words of Emanuel, not the prophet, Rahm Emanuel, this is one of those situations where you never let a serious crisis go to waste. It's an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.

Specifically, the crisis was the pandemic that was taking place, the opportunity to do something that had been resisted for two decades, which is to create a wide-scale, open mail-in ballot process, which we had been warned about by none other than Jimmy Carter and James Baker in a report they did in 2006, I believe, on election reform. And in it, they very, very seriously warn us, quote, mail-in balloting is the largest source of voter fraud.

And I don't think there's any dispute about that, mail-in balloting is exceedingly dangerous and can much more

easily be used to effectuate a voter fraud, a deliberate voter fraud. And we believe that in this case, we're going to prove that former President Carter and former Secretary Baker were prophets.

This mail-in system, this new mail-in system, which, as I said, President Carter warned against, Justice Souter warned against it, even The New York Times wrote articles explaining how dangerous this was. They've since changed their position.

And this whole situation, on a smaller scale, goes back to as early as 1960 when Mayor Daley held back votes in Chicago so that he could tidy up the result to make sure it came out the way he wanted. Or you can go to 2018 in Florida in the governor's election and the senate election, the votes from Palm Beach County and Broward County were withheld for ten days to see if they could catch up until a group of ballots were found heading from Jacksonville to Palm Beach that appeared to be fraudulent ballots. And the election came to an end, and Florida reformed its system so we didn't have that happen again this year.

Well, this practice of holding back votes, which happens in my city also, Your Honor, is a time-honored practice that's done in the big cities, particularly the corrupt big cities in our country. All of the sudden, we now have -- it's almost like, you know, putting them in a candy store. We now

have a wonderful opportunity to hold back votes, even to produce votes after the election to make up a deficit.

So what happened? In 2016, in this state, in the Commonwealth, there were only 266,000 absentee ballots, this year, so far, 2.6 million. That's a totally different world. And the number of -- and the allegations that we're talking about take place in each one of these counties, but the principal ones are in Philadelphia and in Allegheny, both of them Democrat machines, controlled by Democrats, in the case of Philadelphia, 60 years, well known for voter fraud.

I don't know, if you kept a list of all the voter fraud convictions in Philadelphia, I don't know if it would exceed Chicago or not. And just this year a judge pled guilty to voter fraud, and Congressman Ozzie Myers has been indicted for it. And I could go on and on.

Relevant to this case, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh we used in this state. Just a little bit to the west, Detroit, similar allegations, Milwaukee, similar allegations, meaning all of the sudden, for the first time ever, that I've ever heard of, inspectors, watchers, observers, they're called different things in different states, weren't allowed to observe the counting of absentee ballots.

Never heard of that happening. I've never heard of an inspector being kept out of an absentee ballot counting, because that's the only time that you can assure the validity

of the ballot, because the minute they're separated, the ballot goes off anonymous and it's lost forever. You can never link it to the certifying paper. And things could be wrong with it, but you can't figure out which vote to cancel. So that's why so much emphasis is put on the inspection process before this became a major way of voting.

That ability to inspect now becomes critical. It is our only way to assure that this new form of voting, which has been widely criticized as open to massive fraud, can be at all policed. And it has been not violated in this case, it's been trashed. It's been stepped all over. It's been disregarded here and in ten other places in an eerily similar pattern.

And also, in the places it happens, they just all happen to be big cities controlled by Democrats who, all of the sudden, have decided that you don't have a right to inspect an absentee ballot. Fifty states have this rule. I don't remember this problem ever existing before.

The point is, Your Honor, this is not an accident. You'd have to be a fool to think this was an accident. You'd have to be a fool to think that somebody woke up in Philadelphia and in Pittsburgh and in Milwaukee and in Detroit and in Phoenix and all the way in Las Vegas and then way back in Atlanta and they decided, oh, we're going to shut out all the Republicans today, we're not going to let them see a single absentee ballot.

And they also did it with very similar devices,

like -- and I can give the court and co-counsel these pictures,

like all these fences they put up. The witnesses will describe

them as corrals or cages. They must have had a subcontract

with a major company to get all of them in all these places.

So the point that I'm making, Your Honor, is, this is not an isolated case, peculiar just to Pittsburgh,

Philadelphia, or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This happened in at least ten other jurisdictions at precisely the same time.

Let me get to the individual plaintiffs because in many ways what happened to them is totally outrageous.

Mr. Roberts -- I'm sorry, Mr. Henry, who is in Lancaster

County, voted by absentee ballot. I believe he made a mistake in his vote for absentee ballot, a critical mistake, usually, under your law, which is he failed to insert the ballot in the secrecy envelope.

So the ballot looks something like this. I used to vote by absentee ballot a lot because I traveled a lot. And you're supposed to put it in an inner envelope. Outer envelope has all the information we need to see. And I've been in these contests myself in New York. They're kind of like wrestling matches.

And instead of doing it this way, he unfortunately just put the ballot in without the -- they call it the secure

envelope so that his vote can remain anonymous. So it came in. When they opened it, they quite properly disregarded the ballot because your law is quite strict about that, as it should be, because, again, this is the only way to secure the validity of these votes. His vote was discarded.

Very similarly the same thing happened to Mr. Roberts. However, in Philadelphia, in Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, in the other counties, with the encouragement of the Secretary of State, they were told to disregard, to disregard that, and they were allowed to cure. They informed people that there was something wrong with their entry.

And, again, they're quite strict. If you leave out your -- in New York, we call it an assembly district. I'm not certain how you do it here. But you've got to have your assembly district, you've got to have your precinct number, you have to have your voter ID number, address, and you need to sign it. Any one of those things are missing, the ballot is tossed, any one.

Now, in the case of Mr. Henry and Mr. Roberts, they had made mistakes. They were given no opportunity to cure, thousands, thousands of people. And since we haven't had discovery yet, we don't know how many. It could be hundreds of thousands of people.

In a certain part of the state, let's call it the more Democrat part of the state, were given a very, very fulsome

opportunity to cure. And we have many cases of their being told, oh, you made a mistake, redo it. You made a mistake, you didn't sign your full name. You made a mistake, you didn't put the address in.

Your Honor, that's a classic violation of equal protection. I have no idea what their standing objection is. That is exactly Bush v. Gore, exactly. If you were teaching a law school class and you wanted to give an example of a Bush v. Gore violation, you could use this as an example. They are being discriminated based on their location.

In one part of the state, you can cure the ballot. In the other part of the state, you can't cure the ballot, which means they would deny their right to vote. I don't know what's more serious than being denied your right to vote in a democracy. And, therefore, how they can object to standing is almost frivolous, Your Honor.

Now, let's get to the campaign. Unlike Bognet, which is the case that, you know, has caused a repleading of the pleadings, we're totally different than Bognet. Bognet was a harm that might possibly happen in the future. It was inchoate. It hadn't happened. This is a harm that has happened. Mr. Henry and Mr. Roberts have been denied their right to vote. Their votes have been canceled.

The Trump Campaign has been treated totally differently than the Bush Campaign. It depends on where you

are in the state. The rest of the state complied with the law and allowed observers. We have no complaints from the Republican or neutral part of the state about this happening.

The only place we have it happening en masse is in the Democrat -- heavily controlled counties that you can call counties controlled by a Democratic machine that have quite an impressive list of voter fraud convictions as part of their history and tradition. And all of the sudden, with this greater opportunity to do it, they did it on a grand scale.

So I don't understand what the standing argument is. I don't understand how the President of the United States, the campaign, doesn't have standing to assert, if we're right, which we have to assume here, that we were treated totally differently in one part of the state, namely Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, where our inspectors didn't get to see a single ballot, and then most of, if not all of the rest of the state we had no problem with that, just like we've never had a problem with that in 50 years. This has never been a problem before. That's an equal protection claim.

Now, I believe we're going to prove it. I believe we're going to prove it way beyond even the numbers we have now. One of the problems that we have in this case and why we had to amend is because as compared to last week, we have twice as much evidence this week. And it's not just here, all over the country.

Just yesterday in Clark County, which is Las Vegas, the election board in Clark County, which is five Democrats and no Republicans, reversed an election of a Democrat based on irregularities in Clark County. Those are exactly the same irregularities that we are asserting in Clark County except he was only part of it and we have five times more.

So we're not bringing up a frivolous argument here, Your Honor. This is happening in all these places. We have already begun four lawsuits. We've got another one for tomorrow. We've got three others asserting just about precisely this same thing.

And how this is not an injury, real, tangible, actual, already happened, why do we come to a federal court? We come to a federal court because the federal court enforces and protects people against violations of equal protection. It protects voters who have had their vote stolen from them. It protects a candidate who it appears, if we prove our allegations, had an election stole in the State of Pennsylvania and I believe in other states.

Where else would we -- where else should we come but to a federal court when we're talking about an election for President of the United States? This is not an inchoate injury. This isn't an injury that might happen, a hypothetical injury. It happened. The votes have been counted. The illegal ballots that were not inspected at all have been

entered and counted, in fact, precisely 682,770 that we can count now.

Last week it was about 340,000. And probably when we get to the hearing, it will be over 700,000. And that's only in Allegheny County and in Pittsburgh -- and in Philadelphia. The whole state, we're at about 1.2 million.

What am I talking about? I'm talking about absentee or mail-in ballots that were entered without a single Republican having the opportunity to observe anything about the ballot. They were kept behind barricades so far away that even as to the closest you couldn't see it. You have no possible chance of seeing it in the back. This is absurd. This is a disgrace.

This is like saying to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, we don't care about your law. We run Philadelphia the way we want to run Philadelphia. You say we can't cure ballots, we can cure ballots. You say you have to have people present, yeah, yeah, we'll have them present, except we'll have them behind barricades so far away they can't see a darn thing, even when they try to do it by binocular.

Now, isn't this ridiculous, Your Honor? This is supposed to be an inspection or something darn important. This woman has got to use a binocular? And this isn't fraud? A binocular. This is totally laughable. This couldn't happen in a neutral county that wasn't controlled by one political

party and in that particular place that has a long history of corruption.

If we have to enter those in the record, we're more than happy to show all of the political corruption convictions in Philadelphia over the last 20 to 30 years. They'd fill an encyclopedia. This doesn't happen in an honest place. It didn't happen in the rest of the state, which is an honest place. It didn't happen in the rest of the place even that's Democratic but not machine Democratic.

This is an outrage, Your Honor, to do this to people.

I have several people back here who endured it. In

Philadelphia, it got nasty. In Philadelphia, we objected. We

were told we'd be arrested. We were pushed further back.

Several people were assaulted. Several people were pushed

around, including women. And then we went to court, and we got

a clarification from the court that we could be six feet

closer.

And when we came back -- and we have two witnesses to prove this -- when we came back, the gentleman who got the order forgot to bring the order with him. He told the sheriff we now want to move six feet closer. We move six feet closer, and they move them twelve feet further back.

Net result, two and a half days in Philadelphia, we didn't see a single ballot. The same thing, two days in Pittsburgh, we didn't see a single ballot, none, zero. These

people wasted two days of their time to be made fools of, pushed around, threatened.

And when we got the order and we showed it to the sheriff, the sheriff said, if you move one step closer, I will arrest you. This is America? They're going to arrest somebody because he wants to observe a ballot to make sure that his candidate isn't being cheated in a place that is well known for cheating? I mean, he wasn't exactly in heaven.

So the net result, the net result is to the -- at the point that we are at now, 338,000 in Pittsburgh, something over 340,000 in Philadelphia, for a total of 682,770. And let me correct what I said, when you look at the seven counties and you put them all together, it's 1.5 million, 1.5 million votes that were entered illegally, 1.5 million votes that went in there, and the only person that knows if it complied with the law is an employee of a Democratic-controlled city or county, nobody else.

In many cases, even Democrats weren't allowed to see it. Democrats weren't allowed to see it because they couldn't count on the fact that all Democrats are crooked. They're not. A decent Democrat seeing this would have said, what the heck are we doing? In fact, one in Detroit did do it and is a witness for us. She was so disgusted by the process, she came and reported it.

So they made sure it stayed with their little mafia

who would be nice and quiet about it. They didn't let a Democrat see it, didn't let a Republican see it, nobody got to see it, completely flaunting the law of Pennsylvania, but even more importantly, completely -- and that's why we want the due process count back -- completely violating what has been universally recognized as a thing of fundamental fairness with these ballots.

Every state in the union has an inspection requirement. That's not by accident. And if it didn't have an inspection requirement, now that a third of our vote is being counted by absentee ballot, well, you've got to have one, but you don't just have to have one, you have to have one that you're going to enforce.

If this is allowed without serious sanction, meaning the canceling of these ballots, this will become an epidemic. I mean, you give them an inch, they're going to take a mile. They've already taken a mile. They take a mile, they're going to take a whole city. This cannot be allowed.

And what did they steal, really? Well, they stole, they stole an election, at least in this Commonwealth. These votes are way more than enough to overturn the results of the election. And one of the questions in Bognet was, did they have enough votes to overturn the results of the election.

We have ten times more votes than we need, and we're still getting complaints. It would overturn the results of the

election. So this is a real controversy. This is a case and it's a controversy, and I don't know, since I went to law school, that's always been the simple test for whether you have standing or not. And I really do believe their argument on standing is just an argument to delay this, because they'd like to delay this as long as possible. It's certainly a frivolous argument, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I ask the court to allow us -- first of all, to deny the motion to dismiss so we can quickly move to starting to put before you the proof that we have. We have hundreds of affidavits, Your Honor. The question here is going to be -- if we proceed to a hearing, if that's your decision, the question is going to be, how do we present that evidence without burdening the court? I mean, a lot of it is repetitious, but repetition proves it over and over again.

I'd say we have 300 either affidavits, declarations, or our own statements that we've written down that will be subjected to the process of affidavits. And we do have, in addition to these pictures, which I'll submit to the court — should I mark them as an exhibit, Your Honor, or —

THE COURT: You're welcome to do so. Mr. Donovan and defense counsel, have you had an opportunity to see those photographs?

MR. GIULIANI: Sure. No, no, they haven't. I'm going to give it to them now, Your Honor.

```
THE COURT: Or have copies of them available?
1
              MR. DONOVAN: I haven't, Judge. And I don't believe
2
     they're part of the complaint, and I have no objection to
3
4
     looking at them, but I'll get to that when I see them.
              MR. GIULIANI: No, no, they are, Your Honor.
5
6
     They're -- in Paragraphs 132 to 149, we allege this.
7
              THE COURT: Well, if --
              MR. GIULIANI: Well, okay, can I mark this --
8
9
              THE COURT: Let's circle back to that. But if you can
     supply a set to Mr. Donovan. And what are the paragraphs of
10
     the complaint? One thirty-two to what, did you say?
11
              MR. GIULIANI: I believe it's 132 to 150.
12
13
              THE COURT: Thank you.
              MR. GIULIANI:
                             So --
14
15
              THE COURT: Continue your argument, and we'll get to
16
     the photographs.
17
              MR. GIULIANI: Well, I'm just at about the end, Your
     Honor. So I'll mark, just so that we're clear at what they
18
     are, the first one is a picture of the center in Philadelphia
19
20
     where the woman appears to be 20 to 30 feet away from the
21
     closest, from the closest counting area, quite obviously unable
22
     to see anything of significance. So I'll call that Exhibit A
     and give it to co-counsel. And -- I used to be a clerk, Your
23
24
     Honor. I hope I'm doing it right. I'll make it Exhibit A.
25
              THE COURT: Yeah, so far so good.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. GIULIANI: In case I need a job after this. This is Exhibit A. Again, a second picture to show how far away they were. And as you might imagine, there was very serious objection by these people to this. The whole day was wasted standing there like potted plants. The first two, A and B, are Philadelphia. Here you are, sir. And the second two, which we'll call C, is a young woman having to use a binocular to try to see. As you might imagine, it didn't accomplish anything. She wasn't able to see anything, largely because the ballots are here. You can't find them. There's C. That is -- that's Pittsburgh. MR. DONOVAN: Sir, Judge, may I have a representation from counsel that A and B, as an officer of the court, is Philadelphia? MR. GIULIANI: I was told that. MR. DONOVAN: Well, I'm --MR. GIULIANI: That's my understanding, sir. MR. DONOVAN: Okay. MR. GIULIANI: If it isn't, I'll correct it. THE COURT: So Mr. Giuliani is representing that what are proposed to be -- what have been marked and are proposed as Plaintiffs' Exhibits A and B are from Philadelphia County. I think Exhibit C he's indicated is Allegheny County. MR. GIULIANI: Allegheny County. And the last one,

Exhibit D, is also from Allegheny County. And since I just got

these coming here today, I will check, and if they're different counties, I'll correct it, Your Honor.

So again, in conclusion, Your Honor, we would ask you to deny the motion to dismiss so that we can, as quickly as practical, move to the part of it where we can present the evidence so that we can show you that what we are alleging, which you have to deem to be true now, is, in fact, true and that we can establish it and prove it with witnesses, photographs, videos, audios, and expert witnesses.

THE COURT: Very good, sir.

MR. GIULIANI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Kerns, Mr. Scaringi, do you have anything to add by way of at least initial argument before I turn to the defense?

MS. KERNS: No, Your Honor. As you know, I filed a motion to withdraw with the agreement of my client, and I defer to the new counsel's strategy.

THE COURT: Thank you. I know that, Ms. Kerns. I didn't act on that. I let Texas counsel withdraw last evening. I wanted you here because I had some specific questions that I'll circle back to later --

MS. KERNS: Sure.

THE COURT: -- that I thought you, since you've been involved in representing the Trump Campaign from the beginning, might best be able to answer.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

You are welcome, if you are not able to answer those questions or if you would prefer to defer those questions to Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Scaringi, you're welcome to do so, but I wanted to have you here today because I had some questions specifically -- that I thought specifically you could answer. MS. KERNS: Absolutely, Your Honor. I'd be happy to answer anything that you ask. THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. Mr. Scaringi, anything to add to Mr. Giuliani's argument? MR. SCARINGI: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, may I just also point out that Linda is going to be representing the campaign and Donald Trump in the state court actions. THE COURT: Understood. Thank you. MR. GIULIANI: She's going to continue to be part of the team --MS. KERNS: Correct. MR. GIULIANI: -- but not just on this particular --THE COURT: Understood. MS. KERNS: Yeah, I'm continuing cases in both the Supreme Court and the Commonwealth Court that I'm handling. THE COURT: Very good, Ms. Kerns. Thank you very much. All right. Mr. Donovan, I'll turn to you next. MR. DONOVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. May I use the

```
podium?
1
              THE COURT: If you prefer, that's fine.
2
3
              MR. DONOVAN: I do.
                                   Thank you. Judge, I have some
4
     demonstratives I plan to use. I just Purell'd up. Can I hand
     them up to the court?
5
 6
              THE COURT: Certainly.
7
              MR. DONOVAN: Thank you.
              THE COURT: Are you going to show these on the screen,
8
9
     as well, or are they just --
              MR. DONOVAN: They're just hard copies.
10
              THE COURT: That's fine.
11
12
              MR. DONOVAN: I have some extras for people.
              THE COURT: That's fine.
13
                            I gave some to your --
14
              MR. DONOVAN:
15
              THE COURT: Mr. Giuliani, do you have a copy of --
              MR. GIULIANI: I do, Your Honor.
16
17
              MR. DONOVAN: Your Honor, Daniel Donovan for the
     Secretary. And let me start on behalf of the Secretary to
18
19
     thank you for all the efforts, and your staff, I know you went
     through to have us here live. I think that's important, but I
20
21
     also know it's a difficult task. So on behalf of the
     Secretary, thank you.
22
              The November 23rd deadline for county boards to
23
24
     certify the election results are fast approaching, and the
25
     Secretary and her team are working to certify the election
```

results of the over 6.8 million votes passed here in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

I know you've received a tremendous amount of briefing. I intend to do my best to distill the arguments rather than repeat them. A couple observations. Let me start, Judge, I am going to focus on the first amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs.

Much of -- I think counsel on the other side of the aisle focused on allegations that are not in the complaint. In fact, the canvass watcher allegations were deleted out of the amended complaint. And the plaintiffs were kind enough to provide a redlined version, so those claims are out. But I'm going to focus, Judge, this afternoon on the motion to dismiss standard. Okay.

So let me start and address what this case involves and what this case does not involve. And just for ease for those that have a hard copy, I'm on Page 3 of the slides. So at this point we have a single count, a federal constitutional equal protection claim. And the plaintiffs' factual predicate in the first amended complaint can be distilled into a challenge to three Election Code practices, Judge.

First, plaintiffs allege that certain voters were permitted to cure deficiencies to their mail-in ballots before Election Day. That's one. Two, plaintiffs allege that certain voters were apprised that their mail-in ballots were defective,

and some of those voters elected to vote a provisional ballot on Election Day.

And, of course, I know Your Honor knows, but so others know, provisional ballots go through a process. They're reviewed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Election Code that involves a public process before county boards, and then they can be challenged in state court if there are any challenges to this. So that's two.

And then number three, Your Honor, is plaintiffs allege generally that certain mail-in ballot envelopes were not filled out consistent with the Pennsylvania Election Code, and unspecified counties should not have counted those, although they allege generally some might have.

Those are each of the three practices that are alleged to be violations of the Pennsylvania Election Code. And that is, under state law, plaintiffs argue certain ballots should not have been counted. That is the basis in the complaint for the equal protection claim.

I believe it's just as critical to summarize what's not in the complaint. There is no claim in the complaint that any qualified Pennsylvania voter cast more than one ballot that was counted. There's no claim that any qualified voter who submitted a mail-in ballot had his vote wrongly rejected. There's no claim that anyone not eligible to vote, in fact, voted. And there's no claim of voter fraud that affects the

equal protection claim. That's not in the first amended complaint.

So to be sure, all qualified Pennsylvania voters have an equal right to vote. Every voter in every county, including voter plaintiffs here, had the right to vote either in person or by mail. And there's nothing unequal about the ability to cast a vote in this case. And I'm going to get to some of the cases, actually, that talk -- I know one of yours does, as well, Your Honor.

But at the end of the day, this case is about a claim that a very limited number of qualified voters had their votes counted, in fact, counted, when plaintiffs argue under state law they should not have been counted.

As a relief, the plaintiffs ask Your Honor to enjoin certification of every ballot in the state of qualified electors, and they do that by alleging that some state officials did not follow the code. That's the allegation.

That's not an equal protection claim. I'm going to walk through that, Your Honor. No federal court has ever recognized that theory. And anything other, I submit, than counting ballots lawfully cast by qualified Pennsylvania electors is not only against the law, I submit it's un-American, but it certainly is not a federal constitutional claim.

So now, Judge, let me turn -- actually, if you just go

back to Slide 2. I had them a little backwards there. These are the four issues we're going to address this afternoon.

First, Judge, is the lack of standing by any of the plaintiffs to pursue their Equal Protection Clause. This jurisdictional defect most recently made clear in Bognet, as well as Your Honor's case I'll get to, remains fatal to the plaintiffs' claims even as amended. That's one.

Two, plaintiffs' claims fail to state an equal protection claim pursuant to 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs attempt to create a federal constitutional equal protection claim when what they are challenging are state law practices. And we're going to show that that doesn't establish, even at the motion to dismiss stage, the Equal Protection Clause.

Third, Mr. Aronchick, once I pass the -- I guess the virtual podium to Mr. Aronchick, he's going to address abstention and the final arguments, and I understand some other counsel may have some other points for Your Honor.

So let me start with standing, Judge. And for that I'm going to turn to Slide 5. Judge, plaintiffs lack standing to assert the equal protection claim. And I would submit to the court there are three cases I'm going to focus on. First is Your Honor's case, the Pennsylvania Voters Alliance from October, Your Honor's decision on standing there; second, the Bognet decision that followed yours; and then, third, Judge Ranjan's decision in the Western District of Pennsylvania with

the same plaintiffs who made equal protection theories there. That's what I'm going to focus on, Judge.

And because I went through your opinion and as Your Honor says about standing, Article III courts -- Article III, excuse me, of the United States Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to cases in controversies. As I've heard it said, federal courts have immense power but limited jurisdiction. And this is what you go on to say when you say it's an irreducible constitutional minimum to address that.

Your Honor then goes through the law on standing for particularity, speculation, causation, and redressability. So I don't intend to repeat the law, Judge, I know it's in your opinion, but I want to apply these facts to it.

So the plaintiffs, in the first amended complaint,

Judge, on standing, are actually quite limited. They argue

some qualified voters were able to cure their deficient mail-in

ballots or vote provisionally when they find out their mail-in

ballot was deficient.

The only specific allegations they refer to are to Philadelphia County in the first amended complaint. There's nothing as to the six other defendant counties, and there's nothing as to the other 60 counties in the Commonwealth.

And these allegations I'm going to show, under settled case law, do not establish standing for the individual voters or the campaign. In the end, Your Honor's case, Voters

Alliance, Bognet, and the Trump Campaign versus Boockvar in the Western District all lead and support dismissal based on standing.

So I want to turn to Bognet, Judge. Bognet faithfully applies these principles, as you know Chief Judge Smith wrote for the Third Circuit. And he explained, this was a quote at star six of the Westlaw, If the injury you claim is an injury that does no specific harm to you or if it depends on a harm that may never happen, then you lack an injury for which you may seek relief from a federal court.

And I'm going to show you the plaintiffs fail to assert particularized, concrete injuries under the law. And why is that? Well, the premise of the plaintiffs' challenge is that certain allegedly invalid votes may dilute, I think that's what Mr. Giuliani was talking about, may dilute other votes that they believe were validly cast in the state, Commonwealth.

But that's not a concrete and particularized injury under Voters Alliance, Bognet, or even the Trump case from the Western District. The injury is not particularized to the voters or to the campaign. And I submit Bognet squarely forecloses plaintiffs' attempt to manufacture that claim.

And I'm going to show you some of the pieces of that now, Judge. In Bognet, as you know, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring Equal Protection Clause claims alleging vote dilution because such harm was

neither concrete nor particularized.

Specifically, the court held counting ballots in violation of state law is not a concrete harm under the Equal Protection Clause. They could challenge in state court, as Ms. Kerns is doing, but it's not an Equal Protection Clause under the United States Constitution.

And the court further held in Bognet that the alleged counting of improper votes is a generalized grievance that is insufficient to confer standing. And here, Judge, if you -- I know you've looked, but if you look again at the first amended complaint, it boils down to allegations that the Election Code was not followed in certain instances.

Judge, if you turn to Slide 6, if you would, I put a piece of Bognet up there. In the Third Circuit writing, a vote cast by fraud or mailed in by the wrong person through mistake or otherwise counted illegally has a mathematical impact on the final tally and thus on the proportional effect of every vote, but no single voter is specifically disadvantaged. Such an alleged dilution is suffered equally by all voters and is not particularized for standing purposes.

And, Judge, the sole equal protection claim in the first amended complaint boils down to a claim that some, but not all of the defendant counties counted mail-in ballots with some facial defect in them or they should not have been counted. Nothing more is left in the complaint, Judge.

And Bognet, I submit, holds plainly that plaintiffs do not have standing to assert those votes -- or, excuse me, to challenge those votes arguing they were diluted under federal law.

Whether the equal protection claim is predicated on unlawful counting, as they allege, or counting ballots that were corrected, Chief Judge Smith's analysis in Bognet confirms that plaintiffs lack standing.

And in both instances, the allegations amount to a generalized grievance that the Pennsylvania Election Code was not followed. Every citizen has an interest in the proper application of the Election Code, and plaintiffs have no concrete particularized and nonspecific.

And the source of these allegations, it's a matter of state law, Judge, which makes any alleged harm abstract for purposes of equal protection. The plaintiffs only basis for allegedly dilution from the unlawful counting is the Election Code. That's not a concrete harm.

Now, here, plaintiffs allege that some electors were treated unequally, but that's not a particularized harm to them. It's a generalized claim, again, Judge, that the Pennsylvania Election Code was not followed in certain instances. And here, Judge, I go to Slide 7. This was, again, addressed in Bognet.

On the issue of standing, the Third Circuit held,

precedential decision, The logical conclusion of the voter plaintiffs' theory is that whenever an election board counts any ballot that deviates in some way from the requirement of a state's legislatively enacted Election Code, there is a particularized injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing on every other voter, provided the remainder of the standing analysis is satisfied. But allowing standing for such an injury strikes us as indistinguishable from the proposition that a plaintiff has Article III standing to assert a general interest in seeing the proper application of the Constitution and laws, a proposition that the Supreme Court has firmly rejected. And that's what we have here, Judge.

The campaign's argument is no different. The campaign argues that the counting of alleged cured ballots or provisional ballots, but it would not affect the campaign in a particularized way. And why is that? Because the ballots that are being counted are for all races on the ballot, federal and state.

I know sometimes we only focus on certain races, but the ballots, as Your Honor knows, are for all federal and state elections, and for whoever that vote is for, all candidates in state and federal races were subject to the same rules.

And, Judge, it's not just in this circuit. I would direct the court's attention to Slide 8. This was in Hotze v. Hollins. Again, this was a voting case, recent, November 2nd

of 2020, from the Southern District of Texas. Here they said the plaintiffs' general claim that Harris County's election is being administered differently than Texas's other counties does not rise to the level of the sort of particularized injury that the Supreme Court has required for constitutional standing in election cases.

And, Judge, that was a case relating to -- Harris County had that drive-through for COVID, you could drop off your ballot, but no standing there.

So in the briefing, Judge, there was some allegations that plaintiffs -- that they were denied the vote, okay, but plaintiffs don't actually allege vote denial. And let me start with the two voters. If the concern of the voters was that their vote was denied, they would have sued their own counties, Fayette and Lancaster County. They are not defendants here.

The defendant counties in this case did not in any way deny those two plaintiffs their vote, nor could they. They're not voters in those counties. Their home counties did not count their vote. And according to the plaintiffs' allegations, they admit they did it wrong and they should have. And the requested relief in this case is to stop votes of people in other counties. And under standing case law, they don't have standing to assert that. It's generalized. And that goes to Slide 9, Judge.

We now go to, well, can the candidate sue for that in

federal court, under the U.S. Constitution, not Pennsylvania law. In Slide 9, Bognet says, For a candidate to have standing to enjoin the counting of ballots arriving after Election Day, such vote would have to be sufficient in number to change the outcome of the election.

And we heard numbers today and pictures, Judge. I don't have everything, I'm just a lawyer, Judge, but I looked at the complaint, and none of those numbers are in there, Judge. And that's what I show on Slide 10.

What is not alleged in the complaint, it does not allege which counties publicized a cure process, whether voters cured their original ballot or cast a provisional, whether any such county has cured any provisional ballots, and whether such counted ballots were cast for President Trump or anyone else.

Judge, this goes to plaintiffs' alleged injuries that are speculative. These speculative injuries cannot give them standing in federal court, in federal court. The campaign does not allege the issues they raise in the amended complaint would change the outcome of the election. I heard from counsel this morning, but that's not in the complaint, Judge. There are no such allegations.

Now, they do argue they'd like discovery to find facts, but, Your Honor, I've been before you before, and I know that under the rules and the understanding is the plaintiffs must make allegations that survive dismissal before discovery.

And, finally, there's no sufficient allegations of an imminent injury that they allege. They advance specific allegations regarding Philadelphia County in the complaint. That's at Paragraphs 127 and 128 related to their equal protection claim. And there they allege that Philadelphia County allowed certain voters to cure ballot envelope defects by casting provisional ballots. But plaintiffs don't allege whether those votes actually — those voters actually cast such a ballot or that Philadelphia counted those ballots.

This is what I think, Judge, is the death knell in the motion to dismiss: There's no allegations about any other county there and there's nothing related to the other 60 counties in the Commonwealth. It's just speculation.

So let me wrap up standing, Judge. I come back to the trinity of cases, Your Honor's Pennsylvania Voters Alliance from October, Bognet from recent, and then the October decision by Judge Ranjan in the Campaign versus Boockvar. All three found lack of standing, all laid out the law, and all foreclosed standing in federal court to address these issues.

And why is that? The two voters, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Henry, they allege vote dilution. They're not challenging their own counties. And a general grievance that counties should follow Pennsylvania Election Code and not count other votes is not permissible in federal court.

Your Honor, I just covered for the campaign there's no

vote denial, the campaign is not a voter, but they don't have standing. There's no vote dilution standing because the allegations they assert under Bognet and the progeny don't provide for standing for these allegations. That's not an unequal or competitive disadvantage under Bognet, whether valid Pennsylvania electors were able to get their ballots to be counted.

So, Judge, I'm going to stop on standing, although I'm happy to answer any questions as I go, Judge, but I'm now going to turn to the equal protection claim. That's Slide 11, and I'll go to Slide 12. But let me start on the equal protection claim.

So on standing, Judge, I just want to say, I think that's the place to stop, Judge. I think that's what it is. There are challenges in state court, and no one is trying to stop any state court, valid state court. But here in federal court, we have limitations, and I don't believe they've satisfied it, Judge. That's step one.

THE COURT: I don't want to interrupt your flow of argument, but --

MR. DONOVAN: Please.

THE COURT: With regard to the -- and Mr. Giuliani and Ms. Kerns can answer this question, as well, but just orient me, how many matters are pending in Pennsylvania state courts, and, if you know, which common pleas courts are impacted?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. DONOVAN: Yeah, so the one I'd start with is, in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently is the issue that Mr. Giuliani and Ms. Kerns referred to about whether a canvass, under state law, is it six feet, is it twelve feet, that issue. THE COURT: And that's on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania? MR. DONOVAN: Yes. THE COURT: Yes. MR. DONOVAN: It's currently there. There also have been -- and I know Mr. Aronchick was part of these, so he could probably hit these better. Some in the state courts have already been adjudicated. And that's where Mr. Aronchick is going to make the point there's abstention issues, there's Rooker-Feldman issues. They've been litigated. And there are some ongoing that Mr. Aronchick can, because he's involved in those --THE COURT: Can he better answer that question? MR. DONOVAN: Yes, he can on the common pleas. THE COURT: That's fine. Let me defer those questions --MR. DONOVAN: Okay. THE COURT: -- to him. I assume he'll answer them as part of his argument. All right. Go right ahead, sir. MR. DONOVAN: Okay. But that I think, though, Judge, is where we are, is the challenge that the plaintiffs have of

trying to -- I know they're trying to get into federal court, but they don't provide standing.

They do have an avenue, and that's the point I want to make, I was going to make later, is, they're not foreclosed from a path. If there are challenges from voters or campaigns, there's a path, but it's state court, not federal court.

So I'll move now to the election Equal Protection
Clause claim. And it must be dismissed, Judge, if you get to
it, because it fails to state a cognizable claim. And, again,
I just want to emphasize this because it is the current
complaint, that plaintiffs' claim is that certain counties
permitted voters to cure defective mail—in ballots and have
those votes counted and that certain ballot envelopes were not
fully filled out but were counted. This alleged violation of
state law simply, under the cases I'm going to go through,
cannot establish a federal Equal Protection Clause.

The amended complaint continues to try to create a constitutional claim out of what's called, I think in both Your Honor's case and other cases, garden-variety election practice disputes.

And now, Judge, I'm going to refer to Judge
Ranjan's -- there's two cases. There's the Campaign versus
Secretary Boockvar from earlier this year in the Western
District. And in that, Judge Ranjan held that garden-variety
election irregularities are simply not a matter of federal

constitutional concern. And, Judge, this is Slide 12 for those. It's not a matter of federal constitutional concern even if they control the outcome of the vote or the election. And that's at star 49 of the Westlaw cite there, Judge.

And the plaintiffs' allegations about notice and cure do not state a constitutional claim, either. The claim does not involve any persons who are not qualified Pennsylvania voters in the Commonwealth.

Instead, plaintiffs allege that certain qualified voters were given notice or they figured out that their mail ballots -- because you can go online on the SURE system and it says whether your vote is canceled, and they might have come in and voted provisionally.

And, again, I want to stop here. Both under federal law and Pennsylvania Election Code if a voter shows up at a polling place and says, I want to vote, even if the poll book shows that they've already voted, they have to be provided a provisional, and what that means is that then gets figured out later. That goes through the provisional process. So that's the allegation here.

Well, so what's alleged? Well, instead, plaintiffs allege in the amended complaint -- they don't even allege that any county even counted any such cured ballots. The provisionals, remember, they're going through the process. The amended complaint, again, I come back to, they only allege that

there was a cure process with respect to Philadelphia County at Paragraphs 127, 128. And the plaintiffs offer nothing as to the other six defendant counties and offer nothing as to the other 60 Pennsylvania counties.

So let's turn now then, Judge, to what do they allege. Well, the plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that any notice and cure process changed the ability of an actual voter because that comes back to there's no challenge that anybody who voted wasn't a qualified Pennsylvania elector. Voters in the Commonwealth could vote by mail or in person. That was equal throughout the Commonwealth. That was a choice.

And let me pause there, Judge, because I think it is a point. That choice for mail-in ballot was passed bipartisan in the Commonwealth. It was passed by the Republican legislature and signed by Governor Wolf. Okay? So to the extent there was some suggestion that any party -- and, in fact, it was passed, and Secretary Boockvar and her team worked hard to make sure everybody in the state was able to vote however they chose during the pandemic. And any suggestion otherwise is just not true.

But, also, we go to the claim that, wait, some voters got to vote a provisional. But, again, Judge, that's expressly permitted and required under the Pennsylvania Election Code.

All the U.S. Constitution requires -- and I'm going to get to the cases -- is that a person have the right to vote and that

the plaintiff voters do not dispute here that they had the opportunity to vote.

I agree with Mr. Giuliani, both of them said, we mailed in our votes, we did it wrong, they were what we call naked ballots. But there's no dispute. They admit that. They had the opportunity to do that.

Now, because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any burden on the right to vote, they had the opportunity, they say, well, allowing other citizens to cure defective ballots before the close of the polls, for Your Honor, it's rational basis. And there I would refer to the Husted case out of the Sixth Circuit, 697 F.3d at 429. And there's -- that's then rational basis.

And there's plenty of reasons to have such processes. Some counties might have known they were going to have higher rates of mail-in ballots. And the counties can allocate resources, Judge, differently without creating a constitutional issue. And I'm going to go through those cases.

And just a couple other related examples, Judge, different counties have a different number of polling places. That's been determined that's not an equal protection claim.

Judge Ranjan, in the campaign's case, said, well, wait, having more drop box locations in some areas, that has higher fraud, they alleged, and Judge Ranjan said that's not an equal protection violation. It's just not.

And the plaintiffs also cannot argue that the counties 1 were somehow limited from having cure processes only in certain 2 The Secretary, Judge, I know it's attached, the 3 counties. Secretary issued her guidance to all counties, all counties, 4 and encouraged all counties to make information available to 5 6 both the parties and to put it in the SURE system. 7 that some counties may have emphasized these more than others is simply not a constitutional violation. 8 9 And, Judge, plaintiffs don't grapple with these cases that --10 THE COURT: Why isn't it? 11 12 MR. DONOVAN: I'm sorry? 13 THE COURT: Why isn't it, if, indeed, that happened? MR. DONOVAN: Yeah, yeah, and I'm going to start with 14 15 going through those cases, Judge, and --THE COURT: That's all right, then weave it in. 16 17 MR. DONOVAN: Yeah, okay. Thank you. THE COURT: Weave that in right as you are. 18 19 MR. DONOVAN: You were a little ahead of me. 20 where I'm heading now, though. And Judge Ranjan, let me start, 21 found that the counties may, consistent with equal protection, employ entirely different election procedures and voting 22 systems within a state. 23 24 And that's slide -- yep, on the next slide, Judge, it

shows that if this were a true equal protection problem, on

25

Slide 13, then it would transform every violation of state election law, and, actually, every violation, into a potential federal equal protection claim requiring scrutiny of the government's interest in failing to do more to stop. That is not the law.

And then when we look at Slide 14, Judge, again, from Judge Ranjan, again, there they were challenging different drop boxes in different counties. On Slide 14, he held that the counties may, consistent with equal protection, employ different election procedures and voting systems within a single state.

And that's what I want to turn to for a moment, is the Trump Campaign's case against the Secretary in the Western District with the decision from Judge Ranjan. They're here. They didn't appeal that decision. They didn't appeal that decision, and the time has passed.

And I want to explain why this claim now is not a constitutional violation, because these nearly identical equal protection theories were asserted by the campaign in that case. There, just like here, the campaign alleged that Pennsylvania's uneven use of drop boxes in different counties violated equal protection for voters in counties without drop boxes. They said one county and the other.

And Judge Ranjan -- and this is at star 38 of the Westlaw decision. And he kind of goes through it, Judge. He

held that equal protection does not mean that all forms of differential treatment are forbidden. And, actually, he held, Judge Ranjan held the campaign's equal protection claim, quote, fails at the threshold because the plaintiffs have not alleged that Pennsylvania's system of different use of drop boxes, or here of different cure processes, will result in the dilution of votes in certain counties and not others. This goes to the point it's a statewide.

After analysis, Judge Ranjan held his rejection of the equal protection claim is consistent with many courts that have recognized that counties may, consistent with equal protection, employ different election procedures and voting systems within a single state. And that's at star 44 of that opinion.

And, Judge, before I proceed, I want to address -Mr. Giuliani addressed Bush v. Gore. And a couple points.

First of all, the bulk of the claims here go to notice and cure process, which goes to differences the way counties gave notice, not the way votes are counted.

But the flaw in the plaintiffs' argument, Judge, is the Supreme Court, in Bush v. Gore, found Florida's interest in certifying its election results to be paramount, and because they said we have to -- we've got to make sure the Secretary certifies there, they halted the recount there because that was having issues that would prevent Florida from certifying the results.

Here, Judge, the plaintiffs are asking you to do the opposite. They're asking you to be in conflict with Bush v.

Gore. They're asking you to enjoin certification, enjoin certification. They want the court to issue an injunction that prohibits certification.

And, again, Judge, this isn't the first time this came up. Again, Judge Ranjan's decision at star 42 to 43 addressed the campaign's argument in that case related to Bush v. Gore, and he held that the claim that different use of drop boxes could be a -- could be an Equal Protection Clause under Bush v. Gore, he said, is wrong.

Such dilution, that is, if it actually happens, such dilution impacts the entire electorate equally, not just voters in counties where it occurs, end quote, star 42. And I think that — that answers the question, Judge, for federal court claims, equal protection, even taking what they allege as true, that voter dilution impacts the entire electorate equally, not just voters in the county where it occurs. And Judge Ranjan then held that the alleged harm by the campaign is, quote, categorically different from the harm at issue in Bush and cases like that.

THE COURT: Mr. Donovan, hold on just a moment. I'm told we have some technical issue.

(The Court and Courtroom Deputy confer.)

THE COURT: So I'm sorry to interrupt your

presentation. What I'm advised by my staff is that we had -- I think ultimately there were 8,000 telephone lines set up through AT&T so that any journalist, any citizen, et cetera, who expressed an interest in listening to this oral argument today could tune in.

Well, guess what, the lines have dropped, so the -you know, naturally. So we're going to take a short recess,
and it will be short, for the IT department to get this
promptly corrected. We've done this before, but we haven't had
this many lines, haven't had this -- quite this much interest.

And I'm not suggesting, by the way, there are 8,000 people on the line. The Clerk of Court told me before I came out into the courtroom there were at least 3700 people who had dialed in, which is wonderful as far as I'm concerned. But they can't hear.

So counsel who are here virtually, you can hear me?

Mr. Aronchick and Ms. Meacham, you can hear me?

MS. MEACHAM: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine, that's fine. You understood what I just said? We're going to take a brief recess at this point, a little earlier than I had hoped, and let the IT department try to get these telephone lines set back up again. Again, my apologies to you, Mr. -- my apologies to you, Mr. Donovan. Sorry to interrupt your argument.

MR. DONOVAN: That's just fine, Judge.

```
THE COURT: I think we need to do that at this point.
1
     So we'll stand in recess for probably no more than ten minutes
2
             I don't know whether the --
3
     or so.
 4
              MR. ARONCHICK: Your Honor.
              THE COURT: The IT department will --
5
 6
              MR. ARONCHICK: Your Honor.
7
              THE COURT: -- handle this promptly.
              MR. DONOVAN: Thank you.
8
9
              MR. ARONCHICK: Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Oh, yes, Mr. Aronchick.
10
              MR. ARONCHICK: This is Mark Aronchick.
11
12
              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. ARONCHICK: Your Honor, while we're in recess, the
13
     Pennsylvania Supreme Court just issued --
14
15
              THE COURT: I'm sorry, say it again, Mr. Aronchick.
              MR. ARONCHICK: -- a decision -- yes. Can you hear
16
17
     me?
              THE COURT: No, you're breaking up on me. Yeah, maybe
18
19
     move away from or closer to the microphone.
20
              MR. ARONCHICK: All right. Can you hear me now?
21
              THE COURT: Try it again.
              MR. ARONCHICK: Can you hear me?
22
23
              THE COURT: No, you're breaking up on me, Mr.
24
     Aronchick. I'm sorry. Why don't we do this. Let's see if we
25
     can tune you back in on a ten-minute break.
```

MR. ARONCHICK: All right. I have important 1 2 information for you, though, for your break. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, what is it? Do your 4 best. 5 MR. ARONCHICK: The Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania 6 Supreme Court just issued a five-to-two opinion in our case, it 7 was my case, the observer case, saying that there was nothing wrong whatsoever about what Philadelphia did. All of the 8 9 things that Mr. Giuliani was talking about have been ruled out five to two. It was acceptable, but it was all proper. Maybe 10 Your Honor could get the opinion while you're on break. 11 12 THE COURT: We're going to do that. All right. 13 repeat that. Mr. Aronchick, thank you very much. Let's check 14 into Mr. Aronchick's line, as well. 15 The nub of it is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently, according to Mr. Aronchick, has just ruled and 16 17 issued a decision seven to two that affirmed the lower court. 18 MR. ARONCHICK: Five. 19 THE COURT: I'm sorry, five. Maybe I misspoke, five 20 to two, seven-member court, five to two affirming the prior 21 decision. Is that the nub of it, Mr. Aronchick? MR. ARONCHICK: Yes, saying that the observer issue --22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 24 MR. ARONCHICK: -- is not, not improper at all. THE COURT: The observer issue is not an improper --25

MR. DONOVAN: Correct, Judge. So it affirmed the 1 trial court --2 THE COURT: Affirming the trial court. 3 4 MR. DONOVAN: -- and reversed the Commonwealth Court. THE COURT: I misspoke, yes. It affirms the trial 5 6 court, reverses the Commonwealth Court. And that is a 7 five-to-two decision with a seven-member State Supreme Court, as you're probably aware. So I'll pull that decision up. 8 9 think that may have some -- it may have some, have some assistance to me as I make my determination here. 10 So for those of you who are down in Courtroom 3 or 11 12 members of the public, we are taking a short break because 1.3 there are some technical difficulties with those people who have dialed in on telephone lines, both members of the press, 14 15 as well as members of the public. For those of you in the jury assembly room who, I 16 17 believe, are exclusively members of the press, again, we're 18 going to stand in recess, I hope not very long, to get these telephone lines hooked back up. So don't stray too far away. 19 20 We'll be back momentarily. Thank you, counsel. The court will 21 rise. COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. 22 23 (Recess taken.) 24 THE COURT: We're back on the record again. We had, 25 as counsel is aware and the members of the media and to the

extent the public is present, we had the telephone lines go down for reasons that I don't understand. I'm told that they're back up again so that the public can participate in this oral argument by listening to it.

So, again, my apologies, Mr. Donovan. Go right ahead. You're sort of midway through your equal protection argument.

MR. DONOVAN: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Why don't you pick up where you left off.

MR. DONOVAN: I will, Judge. Thank you. And where we were discussing was really why the allegations here do not establish an equal protection vote dilution claim. And I was on the Campaign versus Boockvar case from the Western District, and just a couple more points and then I want to point to some other cases.

But what Judge Ranjan said there in the drop box context where they were saying it was unequal, right before star 44 he said what plaintiffs, they're the campaign, have really identified then are not uneven risks of vote dilution affecting voters in some counties more than equivalent voters in others, but merely different voting procedures in different counties that may contribute different amounts of vote dilution distributed equally across the electorate as a whole. The court finds that this is not an equal protection issue. And I'd submit that's the same claim here.

And, finally, with respect to that, I come back to the

end of that section from Judge Ranjan's opinion. He's citing other courts, but he says, It is well established that even violations of state election laws by state officials, let alone violations by unidentified third parties, do not give rise to federal constitutional claims. And then he goes on at the end, he goes what they were alleging there, this type of equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. And, Judge, I'd submit we're no different here.

And at Page 27 of our brief to the amended complaint we cited Judge Ranjan, but we also cited two other cases. I just want to give you the context to see. One is the Northeast Ohio Coal. for the Homeless. And there the Sixth Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge even where the plaintiffs presented uncontested evidence that in determining whether to reject a given ballot, the practices of boards of elections can vary and sometimes considerably.

In the Eleventh Circuit in 2006, Wexler, plaintiffs do not contend that equal protection requires a state to employ a single kind of voting system throughout the state. Indeed, local variety in voting systems can be justified by concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so on.

The point is, Judge, general complaints, whether there are differences between counties or that counties may have counted some ballots differently, is not a federal court equal protection claim. And for that, Judge, I'd move on to Slide 15

just to show you a couple other courts. Short v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit, and there they said, Under the plaintiffs' theory, unless California foists a new system on all 58 counties at once, it creates an unconstitutional vote dilution in counties that do not participate in the pilot plan they have there. Nothing in the Constitution, the Supreme Court's controlling precedent, or our case law suggests that we can micromanage a state's election process to this degree. No different here, Judge.

And then Slide 16, Judge, two more cases I just want to tick off particularly. One is the Fifth Circuit recently where, again, they said, A law that makes it easier for others to vote does not abridge any person's right to vote. And this goes to the named plaintiffs, voter plaintiffs here. There was the drive-through. Again, the July 27 and October 1 proclamations, which must be read together to make sense, are beyond doubt — are beyond any doubt measures that make it easier for eligible Texans to vote absentee. How this expansion of the voting opportunities burdens anyone's right to vote is a mystery.

And, finally, Judge, the District of Nevada recently, there they said, Clark County's plan to make it easier or more convenient to vote in Clark County but does not have any adverse effects on the ability of voters in other counties to vote. Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their claim of

equal protection violation where they provide no evidence, and cannot provide any, that the Clark County plan makes it harder for voters in other counties to vote.

The same thing here for the two voter plaintiffs. They said, we couldn't vote, but nothing any county did, anybody did, made it any harder. They got to vote by mail. Unfortunately, they didn't do the secrecy envelope, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, under state law, said that's required, so they weren't counted.

So where does that leave us, Judge? Well, where it leaves us is that the two named plaintiffs, as I said, they don't have standing, but they also can't make an Equal Protection Clause claim because the fact that some counties may have taken some steps to tell people, hey, your mail-in vote is defective, you can vote provisional if you want and we'll see if it gets counted, didn't impact them. They got the right to vote.

And the same thing for the campaign that I talked about earlier about -- what they talk about for the campaign, right, the competitive advantage. And I just went through all these equal protection claims cases, including the campaign's case in the Western District. And there -- what they can't show here is that any ballot that was counted affected any race differently on ballots and it affected all candidates, and that's under federal equal protection law.

So to wrap this section up, Judge, the Secretary fundamentally disagrees with allegations that the Pennsylvania Election Code was violated or there was fraud. In fact, it's quite a huge success during the pandemic that almost seven million Pennsylvania citizens voted. But that's not an issue in this case. That's not an issue in this case.

Suffice it to say the plaintiffs' allegations, as they've alleged in the first amended complaint, do not establish a federal Equal Protection Clause that they can pursue, and it should be dismissed today as a matter of law.

And, Judge, I want to end my section before I hand off to Mr. Aronchick where you started today, Judge. There's one count in this case that's active. The second one is for appeal. Mr. Giuliani spent a lot of time on canvass, and I know the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now ruled, so I think that's moot.

But more importantly, for our purposes, Judge, the redline the plaintiffs provided about the canvass is deleted, deleted, deleted, deleted. So, you know, I'm here on a motion to dismiss, so I think we have to take the first amended complaint. No standing, no Equal Protection Clause claim, and they deleted the claims Mr. Giuliani talked about.

And I want to add one final point. To say they don't have a federal Equal Protection Clause claim does not mean there can't be challenges. Both -- I'm sure there are lots

```
of -- I know the campaign here did, they challenged on Election
1
     Day, they challenged after Election Day, they're challenging
2
     still in state court. That's to be decided by state court.
3
     But for our purposes, Judge, they do not have a federal -- they
4
     don't have standing, and they don't have a federal equal
5
 6
     protection claim. Thank you, Judge, for your time again.
7
              THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
              MR. DONOVAN: I turn to Mr. Aronchick next.
8
9
              THE COURT: Mr. Aronchick, are you ready to proceed on
     the abstention issues? Mr. Aronchick, you're speaking.
10
     think you may still be on mute.
11
12
              MR. ARONCHICK: Am I unmuted now?
              THE COURT: Let's try it again.
13
              MR. ARONCHICK: Am I unmuted now?
14
15
              THE COURT: Yes. Could we turn him up just a little
     bit?
16
17
              MR. ARONCHICK: Okay. Your Honor, Your Honor --
              THE COURT: Maybe could we turn you up just a little
18
19
     bit in volume, sir?
              MR. ARONCHICK: I'm at the highest I can be here.
20
21
              THE COURT: That's fine.
              MR. ARONCHICK: Do you have a volume control?
22
              THE COURT: No, you're good. That was good. Counsel,
23
24
     can you hear him?
25
              MR. ARONCHICK: Okay?
```

THE COURT: Counsel has indicated yes. You were good 1 there just a moment ago, Mr. Aronchick. Go right ahead. 2 (The following argument was via Webex with intermittent 3 audio difficulties:) 4 5 MR. ARONCHICK: Thank you, Judge Brann, and thank you 6 for the courtesy of appearing virtually. I appreciate that a 7 lot. Your Honor, I was prepared and will address 8 9 abstention, but because of a number of the items that Mr. Giuliani raised, because of some of the intervening case 10 law from the Supreme Court, because of your questions that you 11 12 raised, permit me to cut through a series of other points 13 briefly, and then I will get to abstention. The first thing I want to say is that if you --14 15 there's a very, very important statement in Chief Justice Saylor's dissenting opinion in today's ruling. The ruling, of 16 course, was five to two that observers are just that. They're 17 not --18 19 MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, I can't hear him. THE COURT: Mr. Aronchick. 20 21 MR. ARONCHICK: They're not --THE COURT: We're having some problems hearing you. 22 Just a moment. Mr. Aronchick, just a minute. Can they put 23 24 their screens up and see him? No, I suppose not. Yeah, pop 25 them up if they can. That may help. Hold on a second.

realize that seeing is not hearing, I appreciate they're 1 different senses, but somehow in my mind that helps. 2 MR. GIULIANI: It does. 3 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, sir. You know 4 this --5 6 MR. ARONCHICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Virtual arguments have some difficulties, as you can appreciate, so do the best you can. 8 9 MR. ARONCHICK: I do, I do. And I hope that you can 10 hear me because you're the important one. THE COURT: I can hear you. 11 12 MR. ARONCHICK: So the first part of the argument was 13 that, yes, the observer issue was decided decisively. 14 Pennsylvania Supreme Court thought -- and you can see that in 15 the majority opinion. And it eliminates, I mean, it really cuts out, I think, almost 90 percent of what Mr. Giuliani was 16 17 trying to argue is involved somehow in this case. 18 And I will address, I am sure Mr. Giuliani is going to 19 then come up and say, you know, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 20 just committed some kind of an equal protection violation by 21 saying that different counties can set up their ways of observation consistent with their local needs differently. I 22 just want to say I'm sure he's going to say something like that 23 24 because he's very inventive. He just keeps moving on. 25 But on this particular issue, two things. Number one,

there is no constitutional right to be a poll watcher or an observer. That's settled in Judge Ranjan's opinion. That's in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion. There is no such right. It is a creature of state statute. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just told us what it is and end of story.

Mr. Mercer and all of Mr. Giuliani's supposed witnesses had their right to observe, and they had nothing to challenge anything. They had a right to see what was going on. They did see it. That's over. That can't be hijacked into an equal protection case.

But number two, Chief Justice Saylor, a great chief justice, by the way, said in his dissent on Page 2, it's important: Finally, short of demonstrated fraud, the notion that presumptively valid ballots cast by Pennsylvania electorate would be disregarded based on isolated procedural irregularities that have been redressed, thus disenfranchising potentially thousands of voters, is misguided.

What the chief is saying there is that the kind of thing that Mr. Giuliani is asking, wipe out all the mail-in ballots supposing a couple, a handful of irregularities, is misguided, not available, not happening under Pennsylvania law. Now, that's -- so that's the first one I want to address about this observer opinion, a very important opinion.

The second issue, I don't think that Mr. Giuliani has even read Judge Ranjan's opinion or even understands it. It

wasn't addressed by Mr. Giuliani in his argument. It was not addressed at all, to any degree, by the brief that was submitted to Your Honor yesterday or the day before.

Judge Ranjan, if you step back, Your Honor, had before him an even better version, a better pleaded version, of the same theoretical thing that they are now arguing about the notice and cure issue. And what I mean is this, in that case, there were 200, 200-paragraph allegations in that case. They all have 200-page allegations.

They put into that case all sorts of elements of fraud, not in this amended complaint, Your Honor, not here, but there tried to say with the primary election, we have this kind of fraud and this kind of drop box fraud and this person had two ballots in their hand. And they showed all kinds of pictures, more pictures and, frankly, better pictures than the ones Mr. Giuliani is waving around now, largely irrelevant because of the Supreme Court's opinion, by the way, but, in any event, pictures. And he said there's all sorts of fraud and susceptibility of fraud.

They also said that in a lot of these drop boxes, which are susceptible to fraud, some counties relied on them because it would make voters' experiences easier in a pandemic and other counties may not, and, oh, that's an equal protection violation.

Your Honor, it's the same thing here. They tried to

say, in the first amended complaint, there are -- 33 times they said there are allegations of fraud. They took all 33 out of their amended complaint. Mr. Giuliani is talking about another case, not the case before Your Honor, some invented case, some fantasy world. But the case before Your Honor, they removed all the fraud allegations.

Even if they're left, Judge Ranjan showed the way here. And I know you're -- you know, we respect him. We respect you. You're independent of Judge Ranjan. I understand that. We're in the Middle District. But he showed you in painstaking detail how he went through each of their fraud allegations and rejected them. This picture doesn't say what you said it said. This picture he distorted. There are no fraud allegations.

And you know what else he said? He said your effort to go way back in history about something that happened in 1960 or 1993 or 2001 somewhere or someplace that amounted to some kind of fraud doesn't belong in this case because the case law that he cited says you don't go back to those kinds of things to talk about susceptibility to fraud in present day, moment in time, current elections. That was really irrelevant under the case law.

Now, what else did he say? He also said the allegations on uses of drop boxes, that's okay. Of course, there is a legion of case law, some of it Mr. Donovan directed

himself to, directed you to, that says that variations on the administration of an election county to county are not equal protection violations.

And what's more to the point, what's in this case?

The variations that Judge Ranjan faced and that you face are variations where some counties have the ability to make voting easier in a pandemic. All counties had that choice uniformly across Pennsylvania. All counties could have done it. They could all use drop boxes, they could all have notice and cure, they all could have done the same thing.

The fact that Mr. Giuliani's favorite counties didn't do it doesn't mean it's not available, and it doesn't mean it's an equal protection violation for the counties that did do it. There is no case that they have cited, there is no case that we can find where efforts to make voting experiences easier, even not in a pandemic, but now particularly in a pandemic, is an equal protection violation.

What they are doing, as Judge Ranjan said, is inverting the Equal Protection Clause, turning it upside down. They are saying to the counties with the lowest level of administrative experience, whatever they tried to do for their voters for whatever reasons I'm not saying is bad or good, but whatever the lowest level of running the election is, whatever the lowest level of opportunities to make voting easier they chose. In Mr. Henry's case, Lancaster, counting the ballot,

notice and cure, it was in the loop. He had the opportunity. He should have read it. He blew it when he put his vote together and didn't vote.

And Fayette County apparently didn't tell Mr. Rogers. Okay, but we don't race to the bottom now, we don't say that we measure these by the lowest common denominator of whatever any counties did. That is not an equal protection violation, that is not a rational basis decision, that is nonsense, total nonsense, and it is not recognized by any law.

And more to the point, Bognet, a three-judge panel, Chief Judge Brooks Smith, Judge -- former Chief Judge Scirica, Judge Shwartz, not from Pennsylvania, by the way, from New Jersey, they wrote a panel decision unanimous that said that the kinds of -- the kinds of claims that Mr. Giuliani is paving here today that amount to equal protection violations just don't. And they went back eighty years, eighty years to the Pennsylvania -- to the Third Circuit decisions in 1944 that said the same thing.

And, you know, if you look at Bush versus Gore, all nine justices said the same thing. We're not talking about differences or precedents or even if they're wrong in the administration of elections and the counting of votes. That's not an equal protection violation. That's not what Bush versus Gore is all about. That's not what Bognet is all about. That's not what Judge Ranjan was all about. That's not what

anybody has been all about.

1.3

So let me just put that equal protection issue over here for a second. I want to underscore what Mr. Donovan was saying to you. The cases he proposed to you, they all say the same thing, the Short case, the Husted case, the Northeast Ohio case, one after another, in the current environment, as well.

Now, number two, they -- you know, Mr. Giuliani talks about when he went to law school he learned about cases in controversies and he remembers from his first year of law school class something about standing.

But what he doesn't remember is how standing actually is articulated in the case law, including in your case, which he didn't even address, your Voters Alliance case, which our firm was involved in. We were involved in all these cases. He didn't even bother to address your own standard in your own opinion. But let's put aside that for one second.

I believe that we have an actual complaint in front of us and first amended complaint. We don't have an invented story, as Mr. Giuliani came here with, about ten other states, about Clark County, Nevada, about something that happened in 1960, about Ozzie Myers, about -- and the mafia in Philadelphia.

He called our election workers, our patriots, our people who run the elections the mafia? I mean, this is -- this just is disgraceful in an American court of any place,

including in the Federal District Court.

But put aside the invention and let's look at the complaint, not the one he thinks he's going to invent right now. He has no right to a second amended complaint, by the way, Your Honor, under the rules. There is no right to do that. But let's look at what's here. And let me direct you, for standing purposes, Your Honor, to the actual allegations in this complaint. That's where the analysis starts.

In Count 1, they talk about notice and cure. By the way, a miniscule problem, not affecting any amount of votes that matter here. But let's just say -- let's just take their claim, and he's saying notice and cure is an equal protection violation.

But what are the facts you have to look at, Your Honor, if you're to measure standing? Out of 150 allegations, there's eight vaguely worded allegations, giving them the benefit of all the doubt, eight vaguely worded allegations that address what they think are problems about notice and cure.

Let me direct Your Honor to them so that you can study them later. In Paragraph 129 we're told that on November the 2nd, Secretary Boockvar told all the counties that they can give lists of rejected mailed ballots, they can give them out to everybody, and they could advise parties, candidates, and voters about the list of rejections so that voters would know and could have the opportunity to exercise their right to spoil

their ballot and vote in person or provisionally -- a machine in person, if they're allowed, or provisionally if there's some issue. This is Paragraph 129.

I say halleluiah to Secretary Boockvar. I mean, what in the world is wrong with telling all the counties that they could advise voters that their mail—in ballots were rejected so that they can go to the polls and exercise their rights over 25 Purdon's 3150, Paragraph 16, Paragraph (b)(2), which is they can spoil their ballots and vote in person if the computer shows — if the system shows that the ballot was spoiled or provisionally if it's not yet in the computer. That is a problem? Hardly.

Number two, Paragraph 127, they say -- well, if you did that, I say halleluiah. I mean, what's wrong with telling voters there's -- you have a right to vote? Your mail-in ballot didn't work. I mean, I feel really bad for Mr. Henry and Mr. Rogers that their counties didn't bother to tell them, not so bad that they didn't follow their own instructions, not so bad that they didn't know the law themselves, but so what?

Paragraph 130, they say four counties chose not to, not to tell the voters what the Secretary said all counties could tell them, and we feel they did. Those four counties, Berks, Westmoreland, Lancaster, and York. You know, I don't know and you don't know and nobody knows from this complaint what did the other 60 counties in Pennsylvania do?

Mr. Giuliani waves his hand around, somehow he must have some superior knowledge, but if he does, it's not in the amended complaint. It's nothing you can do anything about in evaluating the strength of this complaint as against standing.

Paragraph 15 and 16, that talks about Rogers and Henry had their problems because they didn't do it right and no one told them that they had another chance.

Paragraph 124, this is the one that for standing purposes is amazing that it's in this complaint and that they still are asking you to say there is standing, because standing involves, as Your Honor knows, in your opinion, a few things, one of which is concrete particularized harm. But the second is harm particular to the person complaining that is traceable, traceable to the problem that is being alleged.

They say in Paragraph 124, apart from the notice that I guess -- I live in Philadelphia, that's all I know about here, gave -- although they try to act as if there's some cabal or mafia among Democratic counties. I mean, ridiculous.

But apart from the notice that Philadelphia gave, they say essentially here, you can read it, they used a huge public service campaign and media announcements and all sorts of information in the public that you have to be careful about filling out your ballots, writing your declaration, having no naked ballots, make sure they're signed, make sure they have the secrecy envelope, an enormous public relations campaign.

Now, these unnamed voters who they don't talk -- I mean, these people that they're worrying about that bothered to cure their ballot or bothered to vote provisionally so that they could exercise their franchise in this important election, how do they know why these voters went and did that? How do they know whether these voters listened to the public service announcements, listened to candidate President Trump who told everybody don't vote by mail, go vote in person?

How do they know whether these voters who went and spoiled their ballots and voted provisionally actually voted? They have nothing in here that traces the supposed harm to the individuals that they are complaining about, nothing, and are leaving it for you to speculate about. And that is not a federal complaint. That is not standing, it is not jurisdiction, that is not a case in controversy with whatever law school we all went to.

And in Paragraph 97, as Mr. -- as my colleague
Mr. Donovan said, there is some -- well, there is vote dilution
from the people who went and cured their ballots or voted
provisionally. Well, if there was, there are no specifics.
There are no numbers in here. You have no basis to judge -- to
figure out what is in front of you from this complaint.

But even then, back to Judge Ranjan, back to the Bognet decision, back to every decision that deals with this loose concept of vote dilution, if it is dilution -- if it is a

problem, if there is a state law violation that somebody's vote was counted improperly, it affects everybody else, not just one person, everybody equally, and that is a generalized grievance. That is not standing.

And then they say, in the last of these handful of paragraphs, Paragraph 131, as a result of this, President Trump lost votes. They just want you to accept that, but there's nothing in here that they can establish that that happened. How do they know that the people, the few people who went and voted provisionally or that spoiled their ballots and didn't use them or the very few who cured, how do they know who they voted for? How can you know?

Redressability is part of the issue. There's nothing in this complaint, nothing that says that these claims, whether it's by individuals, whether it's by the campaign, have any business of redressability, other than Mr. Giuliani's notion that let's just throw out 680,000 votes, which, by the way, because observers couldn't see things.

By the way, that is what the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court just said you can't do under Pennsylvania law. But

common sense, Your Honor, would say that you can't do it based

on this complaint. Can you imagine anybody understanding a

court order canceling six hundred -- or up to now, I get from

Mr. Giuliani, 1.2 million votes based on nothing in this

amended complaint?

Can you -- I mean, the idea of that, you are being asked to do that, honestly, Your Honor, I don't use these words very much, I am in court a lot, it is disgraceful that you're even being asked to do that. That is not -- whatever. And so, you know, that's it. That's it.

So when we talk about standing, we don't know anything that's important from this complaint, anything. I just went through all of that.

Let me give you the one fundamental about this, and that is this: This complaint is, at its core, at its essence, a small, bald complaint about a certain kind of procedure that the Secretary said is available to counties, a limited procedure that if the ballot wasn't completely -- wasn't signed, come in and sign it and then we'll put you into the system for canvass.

Now, how does that come about as a matter of state law? Here's how it comes about. Under state law, the -- to give you the citation, 25 Purdon's 3150, 16(b)(1), there is an activity that happens before the canvass and pre-canvass.

Mr. Giuliani didn't tell you about this. That activity is that the board of elections are supposed to prepare a register of all of the votes that they're going to count, that are being put into the counting system, the canvassing system, all the mail-in votes. They have to prepare a register.

So when they're doing administrative work to prepare

that register to put it into the pre-canvass and the canvass, they naturally are looking at the mail that came in. They're not opening it. They maybe would look at one, and, look, here's one, the declaration, oh, this isn't signed.

We have sophisticated machinery now that Your Honor knows about from the Voter Alliance case. But they were complaining, oh, it's so terrible that there was funding for counties to have sophisticated machinery to move the counting along, but they did it.

And it's sophisticated machinery because it's being weighed in the back, that's coming through, and if it doesn't have a secrecy envelope, then it is going to weigh less, imperceptibly less, but that's how good the machinery is. And so, oh, look, this ballot apparently doesn't have a secrecy envelope, we can't open it, we're not going to open it, so we pull it out, we're not going to put it on the register. That is the administrative crunching the counties do.

Now, some of the counties develop small numbers of votes, these are not big numbers, and call voters, you know, we're not going to put your vote on — this is before Election Day, days before, we know you don't want to vote in person because of the pandemic, that's why — perhaps that's why you voted by mail. We're not going to make you go and vote in person because of the pandemic, we're not going to spoil that ballot. You can spoil that ballot and vote in person.

We're going to tell you if you want to come in and sign it, sign it. We don't know if you're a Trump voter, we don't know if you're a Green Party voter, we don't know if you're a Biden voter, we don't know, but come in and sign it. And all voters equally have that opportunity, and some voters took advantage of it, not many.

Now, the second thing that happens is, the vote is in canvass, and at the canvass, they're evaluating these votes, are they filled out, is there a defect, what's going on, and some voters either knew about their rights, heard it on the public relations information that they plead in their complaint -- I'm not going outside of the complaint, not like Mr. Giuliani. I'm staying in this complaint. That's what they plead. And they went and voted provisionally. Okay, so what?

But here's the thing, if there's anything wrong about that -- and this gets to the question you asked me, you -- Mr. Donovan punted to me that you asked. There are state law remedies and procedures to challenge at the county level, county by county, whether they do or don't or should or shouldn't count that vote.

And on Page 10 and 11 of our brief, we listed the cases that we knew about, that we knew about at the time last week when we sent in our brief. Since then -- I'm going to use apparently an Allegheny County decision. There is a -- I believe a Chester County. No, I'm sorry, a Berks County

decision. And these common pleas decisions, election decisions, common pleas decisions, are moving through the system as they should.

And, now, a new development is that we find yesterday, last evening, a King's Bench -- here's what happened, the Commonwealth Court took the Philadelphia, five Philadelphia cases, consolidated them together and set them down for argument on Thursday.

And these cases, these cases are dealing with general -- challenges of all sorts to the mail-in ballots at the county level. And, again, not many, not many votes, not many votes, and I'll address that in a second, but nothing that's going to affect the outcome of the election, nothing, not even close, not the number of votes, not even close.

But the Commonwealth Court consolidated those cases, and they set it down for argument on Thursday. Looking at the -- you know, what happened in these Philadelphia challenges, a total number of about maybe 8,000 votes in Philly completely that are -- that are under challenge in the Commonwealth Court.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, how many?

MR. ARONCHICK: And --

THE COURT: Mr. Aronchick, how many?

MR. ARONCHICK: About 8,000. I believe it's about 8,000. I'm giving you round numbers. I can give you precise

numbers afterward, but I'm giving you round numbers. I believe it's about 8,000. That's the order of magnitude.

And then last night we filed -- we said, look, in these cases that are going to percolate from other counties, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, would you be available to take a King's Bench because, you know, November 23rd is right on our heels here. If the Commonwealth Court makes a decision, then there's going to be an appeal -- you know, it's going to be Sunday and you're going to be in this, so how about a King's Bench.

And it's under advisement right now, Your Honor, and they want an answer to the King's Bench petition at 5 o'clock. Is it 5 o'clock yet? In a half hour. They wanted answers, and I guess they'll decide whether they're going to take this particular challenge up as a King's Bench.

So that's what we know about right now about the county things. But there's one point I want to address about that, and that is this, Judge Ranjan, it's going to get to -- some points I want to make about abstention, but it comes up here logically, and I just want to point this out.

Judge Ranjan was facing the same kind of an issue, drop boxes and whether signatures were even required under the -- you know, on mail-in ballot declarations. And he said, well, I'm going to abstain under Pullman and Younger, and I'm saying to you Trump Campaign, because it's the same campaign,

I'm saying to you Trump Campaign, you wrote this, you have state remedies.

This is way before the eve of certification. This is in August. You have state remedies. There are cases pending. You can go intervene. That's your choice. You can build a new case. That's your choice. But you need to do that. Don't ask me, because the kind of claims you're putting at my doorstep are equal protection claims based on state law violations, and I want to know from the authoritative courts what state law violations you're talking about here.

Now, the same thing here. And one case to dwell on is the Hamm case, which we mention on Page 10 and 11 of our brief, the Hamm case which is before Judge Brobson in Commonwealth Court. That was a challenge by some -- by voters, different parties, about the mail-in ballots and whether you can spoil and whether you can vote provisionally.

And the main thing that they're -- in this small, you know, complaint that they're trying to dress up as something big before Your Honor, the main piece of it is about whether you can spoil your ballot and vote provisionally, believe it or not. That's the main piece.

And Judge Brobson said, look, okay, I want who's counting these to segregate those ballots, go ahead and count, but segregate them, and there were 593 ballots segregated.

Five hundred and ninety-three, this is the order of magnitude

we're talking about, segregated.

Now, maybe that will come back to Judge Brobson. The case is still open. But here's the thing about abstention, the Democratic Party intervened and was granted party status. The Trump Campaign knows about that case. They didn't intervene. They could have. Judge Ranjan told them in the summer, if you can, do it.

No, instead, they wanted to dress up that issue for you and ask you as a federal court to audit this election, to collaterally sideswipe this election, to act as some kind of superior appellate court over the state court. It's a Rooker-Feldman problem.

That's how they came about doing this. They did not choose the logical path under Younger and Pullman. Instead, they come running in here and they don't even talk about the complaint that is before Your Honor. Mr. Giuliani is talking about something that is not before Your Honor, not before Your Honor.

So let me go back to abstention. There are so many ways and cases and authorities on this point, Your Honor, I don't even know where to start. Judge Ranjan put a lot of them together. It starts with the Pullman and Younger, meaning is there something pending or something that could be pending, basically, is what it means.

And the fundamental question is the one I said before,

is it okay, when they're compiling a registry of absentee votes and the same problems, to let voters know they can come in and correct the problem and not have to go into the polling place on Election Day if they -- and many voters can't and don't want to.

And that's the issue. The -- it is up to them. It's their burden to show you why they can't go or didn't go to the Supreme Court -- state court, rather, and get a ruling on that issue. I mean, they presumably still can, but they didn't.

And that -- you know, if anything, Your Honor, I'm urging you, I'm pleading that you tell them just what Judge Ranjan told them, I am not getting involved. You had -- and if you waived them, that's too bad -- or have whatever opportunities you can think of to go to the state court and get a ruling on your question.

You know, there is an opportunity now, still, under the Election Code, under our contest provisions, that they can raise up to the day of certification, that they need not — they are (inaudible). They are the ones that Judge Diamond faced in the Stein case in 2016. I'll address that in a second. They are there.

But it is too bad for them if they don't like what the Election Code has provided as their remedy because it's too hard, it requires actual evidence and not sweeping statements about hearsay affidavits in Nevada or anywhere else. They have

to put real evidence in the contest petition and they have to show real numbers of votes that are affected and they have to put up a very good fight.

But that is available to them if that's where they want to go. And that is -- and that is why abstention is so important. I mean, it's abstention on steroids. And here's why, what you have in front of you is not only Younger and Pullman abstention, it's abstention on legal steroids. Here's why, look at what Judge Diamond said in the Stein case. The Stein case is very instructive.

In 2016, Jill Stein was the Mr. Giuliani today. Jill Stein was the one who came in with all sorts of sweeping allegations about hacked voting machines and all sorts of incidents of fraud around the Commonwealth and in the world and in the universe. That was Jill Stein then.

And Jill Stein, unlike the Trump campaign today, at least went ahead and filed a contest petition. Remember, she was faced with a million-dollar bond, decided, whoops, I'm going to go to federal court instead. So it went there to here.

In other words, in 2016, Jill Stein is Trump today, the Trump Campaign today. In 2016, the Trump Campaign was us today. The Trump Campaign said, no way, Ms. Stein, abstention, get out of federal court. Your case doesn't belong in federal court. It's not an equal protection violation. It's an

abstention problem. That's what they said then. They were 1 right then. So are we today. Same campaign, different 2 election. 3 MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, I couldn't hear what he 4 just said. 5 6 MR. ARONCHICK: And we don't play fast and loose with 7 federal courts. And on that point, Judge Diamond said the following -- this is why I said it's abstention on steroids. 8 9 Judge Diamond --THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Aronchick, again, we're 10 having maybe some difficulty hearing you, and I don't know what 11 12 we do to improve that. It may be -- and I don't say this 13 disrespectfully, maybe you're moving around too much. MR. ARONCHICK: Okay. I don't think so, but I don't 14 15 have much more to do. And, I'm sorry, I may -- I mean, if I'm moving around too much, I'll try to --16 17 THE COURT: Try not to move. Are you looking at me? MR. ARONCHICK: I will. 18 19 THE COURT: I'm not moving at all. I'm like -- if you 20 follow me, I mean, I'm not moving. Once in a while I'll prop my -- in a characteristic Brann move. It doesn't mean I'm 21 bored. It's just I picked it up my from father, I think, I put 22 my fingers to my head. That's as much movement as you're going 23 24 to get from me. So you might want to model that and see if 25 your voice improves.

MR. ARONCHICK: Okay, okay. 1 2 THE COURT: In a characteristic gesture --3 MR. ARONCHICK: I appreciate that. 4 THE COURT: -- I'll go like this. I won't move for a 5 while. 6 MR. ARONCHICK: I'm going to stay right at your 7 glasses and not --THE COURT: Perfect. 8 9 MR. ARONCHICK: -- and not avert my face. THE COURT: I'm staring right at yours. The camera is 10 here, but I'm looking directly at you, believe it or not. So 11 12 don't move, just your lips. 13 MR. ARONCHICK: I'm not going to move. My lips are moving. But, Your Honor, I want to know if you got my 14 15 arguments already, or do I have to go back over any of it? THE COURT: Oh, no, no. Let's just pick up where 16 17 you left off. 18 MR. ARONCHICK: Okay. So what I want to say about Judge Diamond is this, Judge Diamond said, wait a second, we're 19 20 in a presidential election and abstention means something even 21 bigger. It actually means comity, it actually means deference, 22 and here's why. It means dismissing the whole case, not waiting for something else to happen, and here's why. Under 3 23 24 U.S.C. Section 5, Congress has said that we will leave to the 25 states to set up the Election Code with their counting regime,

with their administration, with their remedies, and we will expect that that will fit with the constitutional imperatives and the statutory imperatives of making sure that by the safe harbor date, the governor is able to certify a slate.

Now, that is the last act, but the first act is

November 23rd. That's the first set of certifications. And
the Pennsylvania Election Code set that up, provided for
remedies. Whether they, the Trump Campaign, likes them or not,
those are the remedies.

And Judge Diamond said, we need to honor that. We have a presidential election. We need to understand that we have to have electors certified by the governor by the safe harbor date of December 8th. We need to move backwards from that.

And we will not, will not countenance, Judge Diamond said, in strong language, federal courts, the use of federal courts on any but the most extreme equal protection violations upsetting that calendar, no matter what you want, Jill Stein, and I would say no matter what you want, President Trump.

And those most egregious violations of equal protection are the ones left by Chief Judge Smith in Bognet. Pervasive fraud, not here, not in this complaint, not before you, 33 counts removed, and systemic -- the system where, like, a hurricane blows out a whole system, when you know how many votes were involved and you come to court on that kind of

extreme situation. Bush versus Gore, which is not, as they said in our opinion, what this case is all about, or the monumental efforts to try to go to federal court, you don't have that in front of you, Your Honor.

And so I would say, just like Judge Diamond, you have a half a dozen ripe significant ways to dismiss this case. There shouldn't be a hearing. There's no need for a hearing. You can already understand what kind of circus that will become. Mr. Giuliani proved it. We're going to hear about Nevada, ten states, stacks of unverified affidavits that he's going to look for special ways to introduce, all kinds of things, based on nothing.

And so I urge, on behalf of the counties I represent, dismiss this case. Please, dismiss this case so we can move on to the real business of this country. You are being -- you know, this case, for some reason, has become a lifeline to the Trump Campaign.

Please, we need to move on. We need to get this election certified. We need to do it the way the Election Code says we need to do it. And I urge you, please, to enter that order, enter that order, and that is it. That's all I have to say, Your Honor. I hope you heard it all.

THE COURT: I did. Thank you, sir.

MR. ARONCHICK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Now I'm going to turn back to Mr. Donovan

for a moment just to orient the court. Do you know, Mr. 1 Donovan, what other defense counsel would like to speak? 2 you have anything else you'd like to add? 3 4 MR. DONOVAN: If I can just have one moment, I'll confer to see if we can --5 6 THE COURT: I can do a little round robin with them, 7 but I'll let you go ahead first. MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, can I ask for a short 8 9 recess? THE COURT: We're going to take one momentarily, yeah, 10 11 momentarily. MR. DONOVAN: So, Judge, my understanding, there are 12 13 two of the intervenors who want to address you very briefly on 14 discrete issues, and then I'm happy to answer any questions for 15 the defense. THE COURT: I will have, I'll have some questions. 16 17 Why don't we do this. I think some counsel have asked for a 18 short recess at this point, so let's take about a ten-minute 19 It's now 4:45 p.m. Let's stand in recess until 4:55. recess. 20 For those of you with the press, we're going to take 21 just a ten-minute recess. We'll be back on the bench. 22 sorry the other recess went as long as it did. As you may or 23 may not appreciate, the telephone lines for both the press and 24 for members of the public were down, and that had to be squared

25

with AT&T.

This is an ordinary recess of ten minutes. Again, for 1 those of you who are viewing from Judge Arbuckle's courtroom on 2 the third floor, again, the court will stand in recess for 3 about ten minutes and then we'll resume the argument. 4 court will rise. 5 6 COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. 7 (Recess taken.) THE COURT: Mr. Donovan, you signaled that two of the 8 9 counsel representing the intervenors wish to make some commentary to the court. 10 MR. DONOVAN: Yeah, Judge, one amendment. Centre 11 County counsel has about two minutes. She'd like to address an 12 issue, if she could, before we go to the intervenors. 13 14 THE COURT: That's fine. Is it Ms. Dupuis or Ms. 15 Meacham? 16 MR. DONOVAN: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Ms. Dupuis. 18 MS. DUPUIS: Your Honor, thank you. Elizabeth Dupuis for Centre County Government. Centre County joins in the 19 20 standing and abstention arguments stated previously, but 21 additionally, based upon the allegations both in the amended 22 complaint and the proffer of evidence in the plaintiffs' opening argument, Centre County did nothing wrong. 23 24 The plaintiffs do not put forth any concrete facts in 25 the complaint which show a violation of law as to Centre

County. We know from the Pa. Supreme Court decision that the manner of handling pre-canvass is a county decision. Looking at the complaint as to Centre County, handling of the pre-canvass, which the plaintiffs correctly note was in a ballroom, which was live-streamed on the web, and, more importantly, all candidates and parties had full access to the room during the two-day period. Additionally, no complaints were made by either party or campaign to Centre County.

The other matter in the complaint is an unspecific allegation that a voter, not identifying the voter or the precinct -- we have 80-plus precincts in Centre County -- received a provisional ballot. If the same were true, per the Election Code, the challenge to that ballot should be handled through the provisional ballot process, which is under the Pennsylvania Election Code, again, the issue of abstention.

The plaintiff campaign team was present the entire time that Centre County reviewed provisional ballots and raised no objections to the process, nor were any provisional ballots in Centre County challenged. Centre County is entitled to a dismissal of this complaint against it based upon both standing and abstention and the failure to state a claim.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Dupuis. Mr. Nkwonta, I believe. Remind me, sir, who you represent again.

 $\it MR.\ \it NKWONTA:$  Uzoma Nkwonta on behalf of the DNC, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, yes. Thank you.

MR. NKWONTA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm here to make a few quick points about some of the arguments that have been raised that I believe are dispositive to this claim, to the case that has been brought by plaintiffs, and I will make every effort not to repeat arguments that have been made already.

First, I want to start off with the injury that plaintiffs have alleged. Plaintiffs have actually disclaimed any vote dilution injury on Page 4 of plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. It states, Yet plaintiffs' injuries do not turn on vote dilution, but rather vote denial. That is in the beginning of the second paragraph of Page 4.

And the reason that is instructive here and the reason that is dispositive here is because a vote denial injury is not traceable to any defendant in this case. The plaintiffs in this case are from counties that are not listed as defendants here. Lancaster and Fayette County are the appropriate defendants in a vote denial claim. A vote denial claim alleges that some party improperly or unconstitutionally denied an individual the right to vote. None of the defendants in this case have done that.

And when it comes to the Trump Campaign, as

Mr. Donovan had spelled out in detail, the Bognet case makes

clear that individuals, whether individual candidates or

campaigns, do not have standing or a right to enforce the general code and enforce the Election Code generally.

These individuals have to demonstrate that the procedures that they seek to challenge and the election law, potential election law violations, will actually affect the outcome of the election, and the Trump Campaign has not even made any such allegation that that has occurred.

Next I'd like to point to the equal protection arguments that have been asserted by plaintiffs and the claims and allegations in their amended complaint only to highlight that the main source of their authority, Bush v. Gore, actually counsels against the rule that they seek here.

In Bush v. Gore, the court never recognized or endorsed the rule that every single locality has to provide uniform voting procedures. Quite the opposite. In fact, it's unclear what jurisdictions' Election Code would survive under such a rule. And it would lead to a breathtaking expansion of the equal protections clause.

And I want to quote from Bush v. Gore just to make sure everyone and the court is aware of what was at stake. The court said, The question before the court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections, that was not the question before the court, rather the state court had implemented a procedure and had the authority to implement

uniform procedures but failed to do so. And that was the issue that the Supreme Court confronted in Bush v. Gore.

Now, the Supreme Court also made clear that an overly rigid application of the Equal Protection Clause undermines the state legislature's decision to delegate to local authorities.

So Pennsylvania law does not have a supreme election judge that tells every single county exactly how to run elections and whose decisions are binding on every single county, rather Pennsylvania law delegates that decision such that elections are run by county boards, and county boards have the power to make and issue regulations, instructions, not inconsistent with the law, as they may deem necessary for the guidance of election officers and electors. That's in 25 P.S. 2642(f).

That type of delegation is contemplated not only by Pennsylvania law, but was contemplated by all nine justices in Bush v. Gore, and there has not been a single case yet that has suggested that such differences in administration of election procedures can somehow trigger an equal protection violation.

Lastly, I want to address briefly some of the allegations of voter fraud that have been asserted in this courtroom but were not included in the complaint, and specifically with respect to Mr. Giuliani's accusations on behalf of the Trump Campaign. Because as the court may know, the Trump Campaign is a plaintiff or at least a petitioner in

several lawsuits in state court challenging decisions of county boards during the canvassing process.

And in some of those appeals, the attorneys for the Trump Campaign were specifically asked whether they were asserting that the ballots that were being — that were being accepted were cast fraudulently or whether they had any information to suggest that there was fraud in the election.

So, for instance, in the Montgomery County appeal there was -- the court conducted a hearing on November 10th and, in that hearing, asked counsel for the Trump Campaign whether they were alleging that fraud had occurred. In response, counsel stated, Accusing people of fraud is a pretty big step. And later stated, Everybody is coming to this with good faith. The DNC is coming to this with good faith.

Again, the court asked, Are you claiming that there is fraud in connection with the 592 disputed ballots? Counsel for the Trump Campaign stated, To my knowledge, at present, no. That was on Page 11 of the Montgomery County transcript. I know that transcript is not before the court, is not in the record, but nor were the allegations asserted by Mr. Giuliani.

The DNC is happy to provide that transcript, but to the extent that those allegations do come before the court or the court decides to consider them, the court should also consider the statements made by the Trump Campaign's attorneys before state courts.

1.3

I'd like to also highlight a hearing before the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and I believe Ms. Kerns participated in this hearing. And in that hearing, the court asked similarly whether Ms. Kerns was alleging voter fraud with respect to the challenged ballots, and Ms. Kerns answered, I am not proceeding on those allegations. She repeatedly, throughout the transcript, made clear that she was not asserting any claims of voter fraud.

So the allegations that you have heard today, that is not the position that the Trump Campaign has taken in state court. And if there were anything that confirms this, I will point to -- and this is actually on the record -- the order issued by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. It was actually filed as an exhibit to one of the intervenor's briefs. And the docket number is 142-1, Page 3, and it's, I think, halfway down the page. And I'll read this excerpt.

It states, The court heard oral argument on November 10th, 2020. Petitioners, being the Trump Campaign, stated they were not claiming any voter fraud, undue or improper influence, regarding the challenged ballots at issue. That was in the court decision because that was a concession that they had made in the state court.

And there's a reason why they made that concession. The reason is because all of these challenged procedures, whether it be poll observers, the ability to cure, they

affected Democrats and Republicans equally. Democrats were not able to stand over their shoulder of county board of election employees while they were counting ballots and nor were the Republican observers.

And it's particularly telling that the ballots that plaintiffs complain of and the claim — that plaintiffs claim were subject to fraud included a number of other races, some of which went for Democrats, some of which went for Republicans. For instance, the auditor general, the candidate in the lead is a Republican. The state treasurer, the candidate in the lead is a Republican.

Now, these are statewide races. These are on the same ballots that the presidential race is on. So if these races are on the same ballots and the Republicans are in the lead, then where does that leave their theory of fraud in Democratic counties or the theory of a fraudulent conspiracy conducted by Democrats?

I think what this shows, Your Honor, is that plaintiffs' concerns and what they take issue with is not the ballots, it's the voters' choices, and that is why this complaint needs to be dismissed. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. ZIONTS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Zionts for the voter intervenors, NAACP, and the other organizations and individual voters.

Your Honor, I promised to be very brief and to not repeat anything that you've heard, but we do think it's important to bring this back to the voters, the perspective of the voters who -- you know, what's at stake is whether we toss out thousands or perhaps hundreds of thousands or perhaps we've heard millions of lawfully cast ballots.

The first quick issue I'd like to discuss is the doctrine of laches. I think we have agreement from the plaintiffs at Page 10 of their opposition in the Third Circuit, laches can be applied at the motion to dismiss. I also don't think the plaintiffs have disputed that this is a particularly important principle in election litigation.

We've cited case after case, there is a basic fundamental rule if you can challenge election procedures before the election, you must bring that challenge before the election. This isn't some kind of technicality. And this case illustrates exactly why this is so important, and it's important to protect the voters.

What the plaintiffs are asking for is to toss out votes, is to disenfranchise people. But if plaintiffs had acted earlier, when they could have, we wouldn't be having that conversation at all. Plaintiffs could have come in, said, you know, we're concerned that some counties, some counties are not making the same level of effort as others to help voters correct their ballots.

Okay, so if they had said that, you know, we could have -- you know, that's not an equal protection violation for the reasons that you've heard, but suppose that it was. You know, there could be a tailored remedy, and perhaps the remedy would have been, well, Fayette County, you need to bring yourself up to the standard so that you are getting the same -- you know, Plaintiff Henry and Plaintiff Roberts are getting the same opportunities to correct valid ballots.

We would never have been having a discussion about should we toss out thousands or hundreds of thousands or millions of votes, and that is the inherent prejudice of waiting until the last minute and really beyond the last minute. It's, you know, can you solve a problem, can you fix these alleged irregularities before the voters go to the polls, before they cast their ballots, and never even have a conversation about should we be discarding votes that have already been cast.

So the question is, prejudice is clear, could the plaintiffs have brought this challenge earlier? The answer to that is clearly yes, as well. These notice and cure practices are not some arcane issue. This was well known. I think it's clear the plaintiffs in their complaint cite information about this that was available before the election.

You know, the court could just decide this on the basis of the complaint, but as sort of icing on the cake, we've

attached, you know, a judicially noticeable document as Exhibit D to our motion. It's an October 15th, October 15th report from CBS Harrisburg, not, you know, something that would be hard to find. It ran a report that began, quote, Will you get a second chance if you made a mistake on a ballot, on a mail-in ballot? Well, it may depend on where you live.

"It may depend on where you live" is the exact equal protection theory that we've heard in the amended complaint, it's the exact theory that we heard this afternoon. If plaintiffs thought that was an equal protection violation, on October 15th, they could have come into court and done something about it.

The one thing they say in their opposition for why they couldn't do that, well, votes hadn't been counted yet, so the injury wasn't ripe. That can't possibly be correct because we know that plaintiffs went to Judge Ranjan over the summer and in the fall complaining about very similar mail-in balloting procedures, and the issue of ripeness was litigated on October 10th.

Judge Ranjan issued a decision where he said, this is ripe because otherwise you would have to wait until after the election, so, yes, your harm is imminent and you can challenge this now. That was October 10th.

So of course plaintiffs could have come in well before the election if they thought this was a problem. They didn't.

As a result and only because of that delay, we're talking about casting aside thousands or hundreds of thousands or millions of votes, and that just can't possibly be correct. The doctrine of laches applies and is another basis among the many others that you've heard already for dismissing this complaint.

Just to say one word about the proposed second amended complaint that we've heard about, you know, that would just add to the prejudice and add to the delay if we're now a couple of weeks after Election Day, we are coming upon the counties' deadline for certification, the safe harbor date for the electoral college.

You know, putting aside the electoral college for a minute, if there aren't certified results in Pennsylvania by the end of this month, there essentially is no Pennsylvania state house. There are no elected members of the Pennsylvania state house.

So the idea that after all of this delay, something that easily could have been litigated before the election, to now say we're going to take two shots at it and actually we need a third amended complaint a couple of weeks later, you know, the prejudice from that just compounds and compounds. That's all I wanted to say about laches.

Just one final word about the remedy that we're hearing about, about getting rid of votes. And the refrain that we've heard in Paragraph 1 of the amended complaint is, we

want to count the legal votes and don't count the illegal votes. But when you drill down to it, no one is talking about illegal votes. We're talking primarily about what's been called notice and cure. Think about the word "cure." A ballot that is cured is fixed. It's legal. It has done everything right.

The plaintiffs are complaining that the counties did -- some counties did something that they weren't supposed to in notifying voters that there was a problem, but the votes, the ballots, a cured ballot is, by definition, a legal ballot, complies with every applicable requirement cast by a qualified Pennsylvania voter.

And, you know, we quoted in our brief the Appeal of Simon case. It says, quote, The rights of voters are not to be prejudiced by the errors or wrongful acts of the officers of the election. We don't think that the officers of the election made any mistake or made any error here.

Even if you accept that allegation, if you accept that conclusion, the voters did nothing wrong, and it just makes absolutely no sense to say the remedy to any of this is that you would disenfranchise voters.

You know, we've heard this idea that what is happening here, illegal votes or fraudulent votes, you know, I think it helps to get a little less abstract and talk concretely about what we're talking about.

One of the intervenors in our case is a 73-year-old woman named Natalie Price. She lives in Elkins Park. She was committed to participating in this election. She cast a mail-in ballot and was notified that there was a problem and it wouldn't be counted and what she should do is go to Norristown, which is a half an hour away, to correct it. So she did. She made that trip.

First she went to the wrong place. She had to go to two different sites. It was pouring rain, but she was determined to make sure that she, a qualified Pennsylvania voter, cast one single valid ballot. You know, to call that fraud, to call that illegal is just insulting.

To say that thousands or hundreds of thousands or millions of Pennsylvanians should be disenfranchised because of these alleged minor irregularities or, you know, slight different practices in one county or another, that just can't possibly be right. So for all of those reasons, Your Honor, this complaint should be dismissed.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Mr. Donovan.

MR. DONOVAN: Judge, I believe that's it from the defense side. We want to thank you and just request that the first amended complaint be dismissed at your earliest convenience. Thank you.

THE COURT: Very good, sir. I have some questions. So, Ms. Kerns, I'm going to start with you. Again, you're

welcome, if you think it's best, to defer answering this to either Mr. Giuliani or Mr. Scaringi, but I'm going to ask it to you because you've been involved in the case, this case, from its beginning.

You're alleging that the two individual plaintiffs,
Mr. Henry and Mr. Lawrence, were denied the right to vote in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But at bottom, you're asking this court to
invalidate more than 6.8 million votes, which we just heard
about from counsel, thereby disenfranchising every single voter
in the Commonwealth.

Can you tell me how this result can possibly be justified?

MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, we're not asking that 6.8 million votes be canceled. We're asking that the votes that were counted without inspection, which are approximately 680,000 votes, be deemed null and void, as you would with any violation of the absentee ballot requirement.

And it always is somewhat unfair to the person who hasn't canceled, but if there's something wrong with an absentee ballot, that ballot is not counted. And in this particular case -- I'm sorry. And in this particular case, Your Honor, it was a plan that was carried out in two different jurisdictions, not in others, to make certain that uniformly Republicans got no opportunity to observe the count.

The conduct was egregious. The conduct was premeditated. The conduct was planned. They have to have gotten those barriers beforehand. They couldn't have just done it on the spur of the moment. And the purpose was to have those ballots examined in secret so that only a Democratic officeholder would get to see it in just two counties and no place else in the state.

I heard the representative of Chester County, I believe it was, or was it Delaware, I'm not sure, say that that didn't happen in their county. If that's the case, we would consider dropping that county from the lawsuit.

But the reality is that we're not asking for the entire vote to be canceled, we're asking that the remedy be the remedy that is usually applied when there's a violation of the rules with regard to absentee ballots. And this is an egregious violation, a planned violation, and the remedy is really required and is draconian because their conduct was egregious. Whoever heard of 600,000, 700,000 absentee ballots not being examined? It never happened in American history.

So the scope of the remedy is because of the scope of the injury. We're not asking the entire election be reversed. But these ballots were not examined, and that is not just a state issue, that's a due process issue.

We would contend that one of the fundamental tenets of a fair election in the United States is the ability to inspect,

particularly, mail-in ballots, which are seen as inherently difficult, fraudulent. You can go to all the authorities, we've been afraid of that for 20 years.

Now we have it, and the only way we can police these ballots, there's only one way, there's the inspection. If you're going to make a mockery of the inspection, I don't know where we're going to go. I mean, as far as we're concerned, Your Honor, those ballots could have been for Micky Mouse. We have no idea, have no idea. This has never happened before.

And it didn't -- and the reason I point it out, that it happened in other states for which I was personally criticized, is because there was a connection here. There's a connection between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. And then exactly the same thing happened in Detroit at the same time and exactly the same thing in Milwaukee and exactly the same thing in Nevada.

Republicans were uniformly refused the almost obvious right to inspect an absentee ballot. I've never heard of that before, that an absentee ballot wasn't examined, and it was done for a specific purpose.

If that ballot were a perfectly fine ballot, Your Honor, why wouldn't they have invited the 18 Republican inspectors -- there were 20 or 30 that they were keeping in a pen -- hey, take a look at it, it's a real good ballot.

And then if you look at where they were and where they

came, they started the process 800,000 votes, 700,000 votes behind, and they caught up in counting a lot of those ballots very furiously. Some of our witnesses will say that they saw them not even look at the envelope, just throw it in a bin, throw it in a bin, throw it in a bin.

And I also take exception to their saying we didn't plead it and that I didn't plead it. My goodness, Judge, I was accused of not reading your opinion and, if I did, not understanding it. I have read your opinion, and I do understand it, and it's completely distinguishable from this case. You were dealing with preelection, and you were dealing with what could arguably be considered an injury that may or may not happen, a generalized grievance. We're not dealing with that. The election is over.

Those two men lost their right to vote. They lost their right to vote because they were treated differently in their counties than they would have been treated if they were in Philadelphia or if they were in Pittsburgh, where, in fact, the Secretary varied the law. The law is clear, you can't cure a ballot. It's clear. The legislature hasn't changed that. The Secretary has no legislative power, Your Honor.

That was -- and then they say that those two plaintiffs, our clients, should sue their counties. For what? For following the law and not violating the law like their counties? Why -- I mean, if I were in that county, I'd look at

the law, and the law says you can't cure a ballot. But then the Secretary says, oh, it's okay to cure a ballot.

As a good lawyer, I'd say to my client, the Secretary doesn't mean anything. She can't or he can't vary the law.

The law is set by the legislature. And this isn't some technical law like is it three days or four days, it's can you fix a ballot that is invalid. That's a substantive law. And I would tell my client, don't do it.

So I don't know what we would accomplish by suing those two counties. They didn't do anything wrong. The counties that did something wrong are the counties that varied the law to make it easier to accumulate enormous numbers of illegal votes.

Now, they say, well, we don't know how people voted. We do know that in Philadelphia, the vote was eight out of ten for Biden. So let's not be stupid. I mean, that's ridiculous to say we don't know what would happen. And if it was equal all over the entire state, what are they doing all over the state?

But the reality is, this was a deliberate plan to do this. And to say that we didn't allege these voter violations of the inspectors, Your Honor, from Page 56, in every instance where an absentee mail-in ballot is opened and canvassed, poll watchers are supposed to be present.

Defendants have not allowed watchers and

representatives to be present when the required declaration containing official -- when the ballot envelopes are opened and when such ballots are counted and recorded. Isn't that what I said? It's in the complaint. I wasn't making up the complaint, and I feel aggrieved by them misrepresenting what I said. I mean, to say it's not in the complaint is just plain wrong.

In Delaware County, observers were denied access to a back room counting area. Other Pennsylvania counties provided appropriate reviews. However, in defendants' counties, they were denied the opportunity to have an unobstructed observation and ensure opacity. I'm not quite sure I know what opacity means, but it probably means you can see, right, you can see, see well?

THE COURT: I think it means you can't.

MR. GIULIANI: It's a big word, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It is for me, too. Let me move to my next question.

MR. GIULIANI: One last point, Your Honor. Those allegations, which take up five pages, and also allege -- as they said, we didn't allege a specific amount of ballots? I don't know, 680,770 sounds pretty specific to me. That's Number 142. And, finally, all of that is incorporated by reference in the first count, denial of due process.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. KERNS: Well, just to -- Your Honor, you asked me to be helpful to the court, and just to circle back to your original question because I think we got off on a tangent, we do believe our equal protection claim is well established and strong. And it should not only survive the motion to dismiss today, because that's what we're here for today, but also warrant the extraordinary relief of the preliminary injunction. And that's why we're here today.

State law can say count certain votes, and it can say discard certain votes. It can say that. But what it cannot do is say, under the U.S. Constitution, count some votes but don't count other votes depending on where you reside in this Commonwealth. And that's what happened here. And that is the simple issue. And I know that we -- today it went off into other issues, but that is why -- that is this issue why we're here today.

We believe that the equal protection violations are absolutely undeniable. And the fundamental question that you have in front of you is how extensive and how persuasive -- or pervasive are those undeniable violations. And at this point, if you go through the pleadings, the defendants are flailing and they're grasping at any excuse not to answer those really simple targeted questions that we asked.

We're just asking that the defendants be transparent, and the stakes are high here. The stakes are very high here,

and we're asking the defendants to be transparent immediately because there is irreparable harm.

So to the extent that you're talking about all of the votes, today what we're talking about is the motion to dismiss and the preliminary injunction to get us through to the hearing on Thursday when Your Honor can hear what we want to present with our witnesses and then decide those questions.

MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, we're asking you for a hearing. And as far as the remedy is concerned --

MR. DONOVAN: Judge --

MR. GIULIANI: -- once we have an opportunity to present the evidence to you, you'll decide whether or not the remedy is too broad, too narrow, the right remedy, the correct remedy, or you'll decide that our witnesses aren't telling the truth.

But we no longer have an opportunity to go to the state courts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has now decided that presence only means being in the room and not having an opportunity to observe, which would be in conflict with the law in 49 other states, which I believe does give rise -- Mr. -- the man who was very angry at me, I've forgotten his name.

He said that it's not a good equal protection claim. Well, it's a darn good due process claim since it is part of the fundamental rights in an election in 49 other states, and

it used to be a fundamental right in this state.

So that's a case that really gives us another claim that just arose today, but it can only be brought in a federal court. The state courts are virtually closed to us now. We can't make this argument in state court.

THE COURT: All right. Before I get to my second question, Mr. Donovan, you had something to add?

MR. DONOVAN: Yes, yes, brief. Judge, I actually want to answer your question. Page 62 of the first amended complaint, plaintiffs ask this court to enter judgment in their favor and provide the following: An order, declaration, or injunction that prohibits the Defendant County Boards of Elections and Defendant Secretary Boockvar from certifying the results of the 2020 General Election in Pennsylvania on a Commonwealth-wide basis.

That means no certification of president, no certification of attorney general in the state, auditor, local races, and the houses. That's what they asked for, Judge. So when they didn't answer your question, that's really problematic.

And I think Mr. Giuliani is going to be more aggrieved because, in fact, he deleted his due process claim. So when he talks about canvass people, he deleted it. And when he talks about 680,000, it has nothing to do with the claim in this case.

I know Mr. Giuliani wants to talk about his canvass 1 that now is no longer a claim. It's not in the complaint 2 before the court. And I do this, Judge, because I want to 3 bring -- I've been before Your Honor, I appreciate it, but I'm 4 bringing it back to this pleading, Judge. This pleading is 5 6 defective, and they've asked you for extraordinary relief, so I 7 wanted to answer that question. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Let me ask my next question, 8 9 which sort of flows from the first. And, again, I'll direct this to plaintiffs' counsel. You can choose who should 10 11 respond. In the amended complaint, the pleading that I'm 12 looking at, you repeatedly mention the dangers of voter fraud, 13 in particular susceptibility of mail-in ballots to fraud. 14 15 However, neither count in your complaint seeks relief from any fraud. Am I correct? 16 17 MS. KERNS: Your Honor, the amended complaint, as it was filed, seeks the specific relief that I mentioned earlier, 18 which is --19 20 THE COURT: Noted. 21 MS. KERNS: -- the equal protection claim. 22 THE COURT: So it's correct to say then that you're not alleging fraud in the amended complaint? 23 24 MR. GIULIANI: No, Your Honor, it is not, because we

incorporate by reference in 150 all of the allegations that

25

precede it, which include a long explanation of a fraudulent, 1 fraudulent process, a planned fraudulent process. 2 3 THE COURT: So you are alleging a fraud? 4 MR. GIULIANI: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, if -- you've 5 6 acknowledged at the beginning of the hearing that the only 7 issue in the case is the equal protection claim related to ballot curing procedure, but you've repeatedly spoken now about 8 9 claims relating to alleged violations of your right to have poll watchers present during the ballot counting process. Your 10 poll watching claims were deleted, they're now not before this 11 12 court, so why should I consider them now on oral argument when 13 you deleted the claims and thus took them out of this action, something I think Mr. Donovan has just referenced? 14 15 Remember what I'm bound to look at at this point. I mean, that's what I'm bound to. The complaint has been 16 17 amended. Do we agree? MR. GIULIANI: Oh, certainly, Your Honor, it's been 18 19 amended. 20 THE COURT: So since you claim that you're alleging 21 fraud in the complaint, putting aside for a moment whether or 22 not I think that's an accurate description of the pleadings, then this complaint has to satisfy the heightened pleading 23 24 standard imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, does it 25 Something that Mr. Donovan is referencing from a prior

```
matter that he had before me some years ago, sort of a private
1
2
     joke, I suppose.
 3
              MR. DONOVAN: Mr. Brier was here, too, Judge.
 4
              THE COURT: It's not even a very funny joke.
              MR. GIULIANI: But Your Honor --
5
 6
              THE COURT: But it's adherence to the rules, I guess
7
     is what he's driving at. Aren't you, Mr. Donovan?
              MR. DONOVAN: Yes, Your Honor.
8
9
              THE COURT: Isn't that it?
              MR. GIULIANI: Yes, Your Honor. And I really have to
10
     correct what I said, because we'd have to interpret it, we'd
11
12
     have to interpret it to charge fraud.
13
              THE COURT: Right.
                                 So --
              MR. GIULIANI: It charges -- what it charges is the
14
15
     conduct in 132 to 149, without characterizing --
              THE COURT: I understand that. So the amended
16
17
     complaint -- does the amended complaint plead fraud with
     particularity?
18
19
              MR. GIULIANI: No, Your Honor. And it doesn't plead
             It pleads the -- it pleads the plan or scheme that we
20
21
     lay out in 132 to 149 without characterizing it.
22
              THE COURT: Understood. Now I want to talk about
23
     standing for a minute. I have some questions on standing. I
24
     understand that the new theory is based on the claim that the
25
     individual plaintiffs were denied the right to vote. You've
```

stated that this is the injury your clients have suffered.

In the amended complaint, you allege that the individual plaintiffs tried to vote in Lancaster and Fayette Counties, but by your own admission, it was those counties that rejected those individual plaintiffs' votes.

So why are you before me in this court suing the defendant, the defendants, for something that Lancaster and Fayette counties did? In other words, why didn't you just sue the counties that actually caused your clients' injuries?

We've talked about this a little bit, but I'm not -that was addressed by the defendants, but I'm not sure
specifically by you. Do you want to take that up?

MS. KERNS: Sure, Your Honor. We -- the violations or this issue was triggered when we learned after the election that certain votes were counted and certain votes weren't, in terms of certain voters were given the opportunity to cure and certain voters weren't and those voters lived in different parts of the Commonwealth.

And we believe that we have standing in this court, in a federal court, because the alleged violations of equal protection turn not on transforming the state law into a federal question under the Third Circuit case that we were talking about, but on the unequal treatment of the voters regardless of what the state law says.

So we're not asking you about state law. We're asking

you about the equal protection claim. And like I said before, state law can say what to count or what not to count, and that's not at issue here. It cannot say that they -- under the U.S. Constitution that they're going to treat different voters differently, and that's what happened here. If you lived in Philadelphia or another county in the north or the west of the state, your vote was treated differently.

And the gentleman from the NAACP talked about a woman who was notified, apparently, that she had sent in her ballot and there were problems with it and she was able to get to the voter registration office and fix it. And that was a compelling story, but we have a compelling story in our complaint because our two plaintiffs did not even know there was a problem with their ballots until a couple days after the election.

So they did not have the same opportunity as a plaintiff -- as a voter in a county where they were being told in some type of a pre-Election Day review of ballots that there was a problem. So that's what this issue comes back to, the unequal treatment. And that's why we have standing in this court. It's under the federal constitutional claim.

MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, if I may, interestingly, on Page 54, the new number is 127, I think the issue that she's describing is really very clearly laid out, because it says in Philadelphia County, they were allowed to cure, particularly, a

lack of secrecy envelope. Well, that's exactly why Mr. Henry's vote was declined in -- I guess it was Lancaster County.

And whether one is legal or not, as Ms. Kerns points out, I believe it is illegal to cure. I think the law of the state says that. And I don't think the Secretary has a right to vary that. But that's irrelevant to what we're arguing right now.

What we're arguing right now is, she set up a system that allows cure. You can't have the system for the northern part of the state but not for the southern part of the state. You can't have it for Philadelphia County but not for Lancaster County. That's exactly what Bush v. Gore is talking about. That is about as classic a case of denial of equal protection with a sacred right, the right to vote. It can't be played with that way. And I think that's the point that we're making.

That's an unassailable equal protection claim for the two plaintiffs, particularly Mr. Henry, who happens to have done exactly in his county, where he was denied the right to vote, what happened in Philadelphia, where they were given the right. And it's the Commonwealth that really denies him the right to vote, not his county.

THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm driving at. So why is Secretary Boockvar here? I mean, you don't allege that she personally rejected the plaintiffs' votes or had any authority to do so. So could you explain how the Secretary --

1 MR. GIULIANI: Sure.
2 THE COURT: -- of th

THE COURT: -- of the Commonwealth's actions caused --

MR. GIULIANI: Yes.

THE COURT: -- Lancaster or Fayette Counties to deny the plaintiffs the right to vote? How did Secretary Boockvar's actions affect these individual voters in Lancaster and Fayette Counties?

MS. KERNS: Your Honor, if you review our motion for a temporary injunction, you'll see that the Secretary periodically put out guidance. And the Secretary is not an elected official and does not have the authority to interpret the law or change the law. And periodically she would put out guidance, and not all counties, it appears, might have followed it or had the ability to follow it, follow that advice.

And the night before the election apparently an email went out to the counties from the Secretary of State's office. It was not made public. It was not public guidance. And it told the counties -- I think it went out at 8:38 p.m. from the Secretary of State's office telling the counties during the pre-canvass the next day -- and pre-canvass is when the -- that was the first time anyone was supposed to start to look at these ballots.

Under the Pennsylvania Election Code, at 7 o'clock on Election Day, that was the first time anyone was ever supposed to look at these ballots. So that triggers, well, why was

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

everyone looking at the ballots before Election Day? But then when the Secretary's office put that email out the night before, some -- first of all, it was 8:38 p.m. when it got put out, and some counties apparently followed it and some counties apparently didn't. And our plaintiffs are a great, a great example because no one told them, no one asked them to come in and cure their ballot or that there was anything the matter with it, and they didn't find out until a couple days after the election. And Your Honor says, well, why didn't they sue their county, well, sue their county afterwards to say that their ballot didn't count? So the issue here is that the quidance and --THE COURT: Well, yes, yes. MS. KERNS: Have each individual -- well, Your Honor, and that's why --THE COURT: Isn't the remedy ultimately the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County and the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County or the appropriate, you know, state judicial districts? I think they're individual. I think those counties make up their own judicial districts, if I'm not -- if I remember the law correctly. MS. KERNS: That would be --THE COURT: Isn't that where you go?

MS. KERNS: That would be a state law claim.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

would be asking the county -- telling the county you didn't treat my individual vote correctly. What we're here today, though, is an Equal Protection Clause -- an equal protection argument for all citizens of the Commonwealth, that all citizens were not treated equally. So that is different than just simply taking it to a county under, under a state law claim after the election. What's before Your Honor today is that because of the actions of the Secretary of State and the various county boards of elections, voters were treated differently, and that's what's in this federal court today. THE COURT: Let me switch gears. MS. KERNS: Okay. THE COURT: And I want to talk now about the Trump Campaign's equal protection claim against the defendants, which you've just referenced. Can you clarify whether the campaign is bringing its own equal protection claim or whether the campaign's claim is derivative of the individual plaintiffs' injuries? Follow my question? MS. KERNS: I think I follow the question. THE COURT: Your statement to me, your argument just a moment ago sort of is a lead, it seems to me, into that.

25 Ms. KERNS: My answer --

MR. GIULIANI: Isn't it both?

THE COURT: So is the campaign's claim derivative of 1 the individual -- you have two individual plaintiffs' injuries. 2 MS. KERNS: My answer would be it would be both, that 3 it's derivative of the individual voters, but the campaign is 4 also suffering an injury because once the -- and remember, 5 6 we're here today --7 THE COURT: What is the injury? MS. KERNS: Of the voters or the campaign? 8 9 THE COURT: The campaign. MS. KERNS: That the votes -- that because of the 10 unequal treatment of the voters across the Commonwealth, 11 12 certain votes were counted properly and certain votes weren't, because if -- we don't -- and this is the subject of our 13 targeted interrogatories. 14 15 And that's why we needed that answer, because if we -if certain -- if everyone would have had a chance to cure, if 16 17 everyone equally had a chance to cure, if every voter in this Commonwealth had a chance to cure, it was very likely that the 18 result -- and this is what we're alleging in our TRO -- it's 19 20 very likely that the results would have been very, very 21 different. 22 And -- or, or, on the flip side, if no one had a chance to cure, if no county had implemented this procedure, 23 the results would have been very, very different. And that is 24

a -- and that is an injury to the campaign.

25

THE COURT: You see, Ms. Kerns, aren't you so happy 1 that I kept you in this case and didn't, you know, exclude you 2 last night, as I did your co-counsel from Texas? 3 4 MS. KERNS: Well --THE COURT: Well, you are. 5 6 MS. KERNS: I think you're happy because I think you wanted my answers. 7 THE COURT: Well, I'm asking if you're happy. I'm a 8 9 neutral player here. Here's my next question, why does the campaign have 10 standing to vindicate the plaintiffs' rights when the 11 12 plaintiffs themselves, the individual plaintiffs, appear to be 13 capable and willing to vindicate those rights on their own? MR. GIULIANI: Well, they can, and we're --14 15 THE COURT: But why does the campaign have standing? MR. GIULIANI: That's what the whole point is. 16 THE COURT: Why does the campaign have standing when 17 the individual plaintiffs have the ability, the willingness, 18 19 the capability, to vindicate those rights on their own, the two 20 individual players here? 21 MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, the campaign's right to raise denial of equal protection derives from the plaintiffs in 22 one sense, and then it's the campaign itself that was denied 23 24 equal protection. 25 So the net result of these two plaintiffs not being

able to cure their ballot is that the campaign was harmed because in one part of the state they would have been allowed to vote, and in another part of the state, they're not allowed to vote.

And it just happens, if you analyze the two parts of the state, that the part of the state where they're allowed to vote and allowed to cure, even in violation of state law, is a heavily Democratic part of the state that was 80 percent, 70 percent to the other side. And then we look at all those other counties and they weren't allowed to and they didn't.

And why is the Secretary involved? Because this happens because of the inconsistent advice being given by the Secretary in which she puts these election --

THE COURT: Was it inconsistent advice that you're alleging or selective advice?

MR. GIULIANI: Selective, selective advice, and also very ambiguous advice. So if you were sitting in one of those counties that is -- one of those Republican counties and you get the memo from her and you talk to your lawyer, your lawyer is going to have a real problem because your lawyer is going to say, I'm sorry, but nobody changed the statute to allow curing and you're allowing it.

THE COURT: Of course, the thing of it is, I mean, we get into the nuances of this. I used to be involved in this sort of thing a long time ago. I mean, I look at Fayette

```
County, Fayette County is a traditionally Democratic county in
1
     the state. Lancaster County, traditionally Republican. Now,
2
     things are changing out there, but I would -- I don't know --
3
4
              MR. GIULIANI: Quite a bit.
5
              THE COURT: -- but I would suppose that the county's,
6
     Fayette County's registration is still heavily Democratic,
7
     isn't it, even if they don't --
              MR. GIULIANI: It is.
8
9
              THE COURT: -- don't vote that way in a presidential
     race?
10
              MR. GIULIANI: But I'm not sure that --
11
12
              THE COURT: But that's the point, it's a Democratic
13
     county.
              MR. GIULIANI: But I'm not sure in this particular
14
15
     election that's as important if it's a very, very strong Trump
16
     county.
17
              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. GIULIANI: I mean, that's where --
18
19
              THE COURT: But the Democratic/Republican end of it
20
     is --
21
              MR. GIULIANI: Well, then maybe we should say
     Trump/Biden.
22
              THE COURT: Well, yeah. Well, in a way, that's sort
23
24
     of smeared together because you're going to have -- you're
     going to have some traditionally Democratic counties,
25
```

particularly, I think, in the western part of the state. The exceptions, Butler County is traditionally a very Republican county, Allegheny County, a heavily Democratic county. But a lot of the neighboring counties are traditionally, in my historical sense --

MR. GIULIANI: Right.

THE COURT: -- in modern history of the state, traditionally Democratic counties, and yet many of those counties are counties that voted for your man, I think, in this last election and did so four years ago in 2019, but they'd still be Democratic counties.

MR. GIULIANI: Again, I don't know if that's relevant in the modern world that we live in. And the reality is, this confusion is created because of whatever we want to call it, inconsistent, ambiguous advice being given by the Secretary who doesn't clarify to anyone how is it that I can change the cure provisions of the legislature.

So people -- and running an election like that is, in itself, also a violation of due process, which is why I want to restore the due process count.

THE COURT: I want to have another question on standing here for you. In the briefing, the plaintiffs assert that the campaign has competitive standing, competitive standing. None of the cases you've cited for this proposition are from the Third Circuit, however.

```
So is there any precedent that plaintiffs' counsel can
1
     cite from this circuit expressly addressing the theory of
2
3
     competitive standing?
              MR. GIULIANI: Well, Mr. Marks --
4
5
              THE COURT: Mr. Marks is going to help you. That's
6
     fine.
              MR. GIULIANI: He leaned over and said Marks v.
7
     Stinson. And we have the unusual situation of he was the
8
9
     plaintiff in Marks v. Stinson.
              MR. MARKS: Your Honor, if I might, I don't want to --
10
     I don't want to do anything inappropriate.
11
12
              MR. GIULIANI: Please.
13
              MR. MARKS: But you asked for a cite, and I was --
              THE COURT: Yeah.
14
              MR. MARKS: But if Your Honor looks to the Marks v.
15
     Stinson case, there is a reported final injunction decision.
16
17
              THE COURT: What court?
              MR. MARKS:
                          Eastern District of Pennsylvania and --
18
19
              THE COURT: Which judge heard it?
20
                          Judge Newcomer from Lancaster County. It
              MR. MARKS:
21
     was a Republican --
22
                          I remember him.
              THE COURT:
                          And, Your Honor, it was affirmed --
23
              MR. MARKS:
24
              THE COURT: What year was that?
              MR. MARKS: Your Honor, the election was 1993.
25
```

case was tried in a preliminary injunction in February of '94. The critical Third Circuit opinion affirmed the preliminary injunction in part, reversed it in part, removing my opponent, but saying that the judge had to go back and have more hearing to determine if I won.

And then there was a final injunction decision that was entered in April of 1994, which was then affirmed by the Third Circuit, where Judge Newcomer concluded if you set aside their illegal ballots, the absentee ballots which resulted from the massive fraud, that I was the winner and that my opponent was the loser.

In that case, Your Honor, Judge Newcomer held under the Equal Protection Clause that the election board in Philadelphia, the same board that's being sued today by the Trump Campaign, that they couldn't favor one candidate over the other. They couldn't give a competitive advantage to the Democratic -- I was a plaintiff. You couldn't give a competitive advantage, let alone in violation of the state law, to one campaign over the other.

THE COURT: And this addressed competitive standing?

MR. MARKS: Yes, it was standing. They held that I,
as the candidate -- I wasn't incorporated. I'm not like Donald
Trump.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. MARKS: That I, as the candidate, had standing

because the state actors -- it was a civil rights claim just 1 2 like here, it was also an equal protection claim, that I had standing because the government couldn't put its thumb on the 3 scale in favor of one candidate over the other. And that's 4 what happened in my case because they were violating the law 5 6 and giving absentee ballots themselves to campaign workers who 7 were, you know --THE COURT: Understood. All right. That's good. 8 9 MR. MARKS: So --THE COURT: What's the case again? 10 MR. MARKS: Marks v. Stinson. 11 12 THE COURT: Marks v. Stinson. I actually gave it to the mayor. 13 MR. MARKS: We'll look it up. 14 THE COURT: 15 MR. MARKS: So, Your Honor, it's sort of -- if I just might and then I'm going to step out of this. It's sort of the 16 17 same thing in this case because there were no observers. people who ran the elections in the seven defending counties 18 19 knew that the mail ballots were going to be heavily in favor of They knew that from the registrations of the 20 candidate Biden. 21 voters who had submitted them, and they also knew it from the publicized campaign strategies. 22 They knew that the Trump voters were going to go to 23 24 the polls, they knew that the Biden voters were going to vote

by mail, so if they didn't allow inspection and if they allowed

25

would apply here.

ballots that shouldn't have been counted because they didn't have a signature or they didn't have the date on them, technical things, but that is -- Your Honor knows those are requirements in Pennsylvania, no different than if you vote at the polls, you've got to be there before 8:01 or it doesn't count.

So that was the competitive standing determination in Marks v. Stinson, Your Honor, and I'd suggest that analogy

THE COURT: That's good. We'll look that up. Thank you, sir. Now, beyond competitive standing itself, is the campaign raising any other theories of standing?

MR. GIULIANI: We're raising --

THE COURT: Beyond competitive standing, any other theories of standing you want to address with me?

MR. GIULIANI: Yes, Your Honor. We have standing as having been aggrieved under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. We were treated, in all of the different respects in which we outline in this complaint, not just curing ballots, we were treated differently than the candidate on the other side. We were -- the cure provisions, backdating provisions.

You look at the individual allegations against the different counties, each of those treats our side -- I'll call it the Trump side now and the Biden side rather than Republican

and Democrat -- differently than the Democrat side.

And the allegations about the inspectors -- I'm sorry, the watchers, is incorporated by reference in the equal protection claim and there not alleging fraud, we're alleging denial of equal protection.

In certain counties in the state, there was no inspection. In other counties in the state, it was very rigid inspection. And, in fact, in most counties in the state, there was rigid inspection. The difference between the two, if you take a look at it, in the Biden counties, the 70 percent, 80 percent Biden counties, there was no inspection, and in the Trump counties, there was the usual rigid inspection.

So if you look at the 680,770 ballots that went in in Philadelphia and in Pittsburgh that were never inspected, you use just statistical probability, expert testimony which is allowable in an election case, it would be eight to two. If you go look at the counties that had rigid inspection, the percentage is going to be more like 60/40, maybe 70/30 Trump.

When you have rigid inspection, more ballots are going to be rejected. So that's another way in which we were treated in a disparate fashion and not subjected to the same standard. And the reality is, on issues like this, counting votes, curing votes — one of the gentlemen, I think quite rightly, said, you're not going to have rigid similarity in every single county, different times, different rules.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

But we're not talking about little technical rules here, we're talking about whether an absentee ballot is accepted or it isn't accepted. We're talking about whether, if you mess up a ballot -- and the rule has always been once you've messed up one of these ballots, you're finished, you can't fix it, pretty much the case around the country. Now, all of the sudden, the new concept is floated by the Secretary that you can cure it, but nobody bothered to go to the legislature and have the legislature change the legislation. So it set up a situation of mass confusion. Well, that alone deprives you of equal protection and due process. An election like this shouldn't be conducted with mass confusion over whether you can cure a ballot or not cure a ballot or whether you should have inspectors or you shouldn't have inspectors. THE COURT: I've been watching Mr. Donovan. He's been itching to stand up here, as he's moving around in his chair at counsel table. You have something to add on that point, Mr. Donovan? MR. DONOVAN: I do on the prior one, too, Judge. Marks v. Stinson, I just did a search. THE COURT: Right.

MR. DONOVAN: Competitive doesn't even come up in the opinion, so it's hard to understand how competitive standing is

```
in the opinion since the word doesn't appear. And the only
1
2
     time --
 3
              THE COURT: Well, we didn't find it. That's why I --
     we'll read the opinion.
4
5
              MR. DONOVAN: No, no, no, sure.
 6
              THE COURT: I had, maybe, difficulty finding it for
7
     the same reasons.
8
              MR. DONOVAN: I just wanted to put a little finer
9
     point, since that word doesn't appear, it's hard to see that it
     stands for that. In fact, all of --
10
              THE COURT: We understand what I'm talking about,
11
12
     competitive standing.
13
              MR. DONOVAN: I did.
              THE COURT: It has meaning, specific meaning.
14
15
              MR. DONOVAN: Yes.
              THE COURT: I'm not dismissing what Mr. Marks told me,
16
17
     I just -- I didn't find that in my research because it's
     specific as to that language. Go ahead.
18
19
              MR. DONOVAN: One more point. There's a little
20
     freelancing going on over here about the advice from the
21
     Secretary. The Secretary issues advice or guidance. That's
22
     her job. She issues it. When she issues it, it goes on a
     website that everyone gets, and it goes to all counties. And
23
24
     if you review the guidance, Judge, or Mr. Giuliani, you'll see
25
     that these instructions do not go to specific counties.
```

gives guidance, which is her role.

As the Secretary taught me and reminded me, that Pennsylvania is a Commonwealth. She cannot enforce, but she gives guidance as her role is, and she gives it to all counties at the same time. And it's on the website, and it's still on the website today.

THE COURT: All right. Good. I want to turn to the merits now. What standard of review should I apply and why?

What standard of review should I apply in this case on --

MR. GIULIANI: On a motion to dismiss? Well, I mean, I think the normal one, which is that you have to deem the factual allegations to be correct, and even if they are correct, you'd have to find that there's no merit, no legal merit, no legal theory on which we can get relief.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, are you arguing then that strict scrutiny should apply here?

MR. GIULIANI: No, the normal scrutiny should apply. If we had alleged fraud, yes, but this is not a fraud case.

THE COURT: So if that's so -- what's this background noise? What is it? Mr. Aronchick, are you moving around again?

MR. ARONCHICK: I unmuted, Your Honor. I just want you to remember I'm here. I want to say a couple things at some point.

THE COURT: We'll get back to you. We haven't

forgotten about you. Try not to move around.

So if that's the case, why don't Secretary Boockvar and the counties satisfy the standard of review that you're talking about? If it's not strict scrutiny and it's the standard of review you're implying, why don't their actions satisfy this?

MR. GIULIANI: I'm sorry, I don't really understand the question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, this is how I would look at it. I would think that it's a standard of review of strict scrutiny, potentially. You're not sure that that's the case. I'm not imposing my views --

MR. GIULIANI: Maybe I don't understand what you mean
by strict --

THE COURT: Well, for strict scrutiny to apply, a fundamental right needs to be burdened, as I understand it. So how do the counties or Secretary Boockvar on behalf of the Commonwealth burden the plaintiffs' right to vote? How do they burden the right to vote?

MR. GIULIANI: Oh, because based on issuing these opinions that are confusing, ambiguous, in several instances contrary to the law.

It's very, very hard to have consistency in the principle -- let's stick to the one we've talked about most often, about whether you can cure a ballot, whether you can

supply the information after the fact. She created a great 1 2 deal of confusion about that and never clarified it, so that she conducted --3 4 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GIULIANI: She conducted -- I guess the language 5 6 in Bush v. Gore would be an election without standards, uniform 7 standards. THE COURT: Well, I follow that, but how does making 8 9 it easier for some people to vote burden the plaintiffs' ability or right to vote? 10 MR. GIULIANI: Well, it isn't so much making it easier 11 for someone to vote, it's specifically the same thing. It's 12 13 exactly the same thing, at least in the case of Mr. Henry. Mr. Henry made a mistake. 14 15 THE COURT: So his right to vote was burdened by the Secretary's actions? 16 17 MR. GIULIANI: His right to vote was denied by the way in which the Secretary's advice was interpreted in part of the 18 19 state and in his part of the state it was interpreted differently. 20 21 Pennsylvania conducted an election in which people in different parts of the state had a right to vote under certain 22 circumstances and other people didn't. So in Pennsylvania, as 23 24 we allege in the complaint, when someone had a ballot in which 25 he didn't use the secure envelope, that person in

```
Pennsylvania -- in Philadelphia was allowed to vote.
1
              THE COURT: Let me ask you.
2
              MR. GIULIANI: In the case of --
3
 4
              THE COURT: How are -- Mr. Roberts and Mr. Henry are
     the individual plaintiffs. So how were they actually denied
5
 6
     the right to vote? If I understand it, they filled out their
7
     ballots incorrectly, and then their individual counties,
     Lancaster County and Fayette County, didn't count them.
8
9
              MR. GIULIANI: Yep.
              THE COURT: But you're not saying that every ballot
10
     that isn't counted for whatever reason constitutes a denial of
11
12
     the right to vote.
              MS. KERNS: No, but here, here, Your Honor -- and
13
     there was a perfect example from the gentleman from the NAACP.
14
15
     Here, Mr. Henry and Mr. Roberts voted, and their vote
     ultimately was -- they did not have the ability to cure that
16
17
     vote. The government, the state actor here, did not give them
     the ability to cure that vote, whereas other voters were given
18
19
     that opportunity. They were -- and you'll hear this if --
20
              THE COURT: But is that a denial of the right to vote?
21
              MS. KERNS: We would absolutely --
              THE COURT: The actions of Lancaster and Fayette
22
     Counties, is that a denial of the right to vote?
23
24
              MS. KERNS: Yes, because everyone should have -- every
25
     county should have had the same procedure.
```

1.3

MR. GIULIANI: Either they should have been allowed to cure or nobody should have been allowed to cure.

MS. KERNS: Your Honor, but the issue here is that the procedures were not all the same. So from Mr. Henry's perspective and Mr. Roberts' perspective, their ability to vote was denied because had they simply lived in a different county, their vote — they would have had the opportunity to cure and therefore that vote would have been counted. And these two gentlemen, their vote was not counted, so they did not vote. Their vote was denied.

THE COURT: Let me move away from strict scrutiny and go, instead, in another direction, and that is, if I conclude that rational basis review is appropriate, why don't the defendants' actions satisfy this standard? You have a strict scrutiny standard, you've got a rational basis standard. It's a different standard. So why don't the defendants' actions here satisfy that standard?

MR. GIULIANI: Well, how is it rational to have, in one state, two vastly different standards about how you're going to deal with what turns out to be 2.6 million votes? And depending on the location in the state, which is exactly what Bush v. Gore uses as an example of a violation of equal protection, I mean, how can that be -- how could that be possibly rational?

Whatever you say about her advice and the advice of

others, the result of it was a totally unequal, completely unfair election in which in one part of the state, if you did what Linda just said, if you made a mistake, you don't get counted, in the other part of the state, if you do make exactly that same mistake, your vote is counted.

And forget even now Trump or Biden, in Bush v. Gore they say you can't have different standards based on location. You can't have -- you can't say that somebody has a right to vote under certain circumstances in one place, but then under the same circumstances in another place, they don't have a right to vote or, in this particular case, the right to cure an absentee ballot.

THE COURT: But in order --

MR. GIULIANI: I don't know how you're rational about that.

THE COURT: Let me cut to the chase here. In order to violate the Equal Protection Clause, the defendants needed to have done more than simply violate state election law. So why is this a constitutional question and not simply a matter more appropriately determined, as I suggested before, in state trial court and with appellate review thereafter?

MR. GIULIANI: It really isn't a question of whether they -- I mean, it so happens they violated state law, but that isn't the -- we're not charging them with violating state law. It could have been some other way in which they did it. What

they did was, they set up a system where you have two different, fundamentally different sets of rights in one part of the state as opposed to another.

Again, in one part of the state if you make a mistake, it gets fixed. The other part of the state, you make a mistake, you don't get to vote. It doesn't even matter if it's Bush -- I mean Biden or Trump, Republican or Democrat. The fact that you have two disparate standards in different parts of the state means that they have set up a standardless election, an election in which the standards are not uniform about something very, very important, how you're going to deal with an absentee ballot, particularly in an era in which that's going to become a much more significant part of the vote.

If anything, the uniformity of those standards, the scrutiny applied to it should have been greater since it now became a much more meaningful part of how you're going to decide the election.

THE COURT: Thank you. I have some questions for the defendants. I'm going to look to you, Mr. Donovan. Do you want to add something?

MR. DONOVAN: Can I respond to these, or am I going to get the same ones?

THE COURT: No.

MR. DONOVAN: I just want to address a couple of these followup --

THE COURT: You're getting different questions. MR. DONOVAN: I'll be short. THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. DONOVAN: First, on your first question of strict scrutiny, there is no strict scrutiny because I think as the colloquy showed, these two individuals were not denied their right to vote. They vote, it was defective, and what the Secretary and what some counties may have done is what you've said, Your Honor, which is they tried to make it easier to vote. That, in my mind, is the opposite of a burden. And --THE COURT: So the standard of review, instead, is the --

MR. DONOVAN: Rational basis, Judge, because -- and then what happens is, since there is no vote denial in this case, there just isn't, it's dilution, rational basis, Bognet forecloses it. So that's one.

Second, Mr. Giuliani keeps referring to standards.

And, in fact, the Secretary -- there's election law, and the Secretary issues uniform standards. What Bush v. Gore talked about in standards is the Florida Supreme Court actually told different counties when they were in the middle of recounts to stop at different points. So the standard there was they weren't counting all the votes.

What I showed you this afternoon in my PowerPoint presentation, Judge, was all the cases that say you can have

some differences among counties without being able to establish an Equal Protection Clause. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, let me -- I'm going to start with

MR. DONOVAN: Okay.

you, Mr. Donovan.

THE COURT: I'm looking to you. Mr. Aronchick, I think, wants to speak, and I'm going to let him do that, and he's welcome to answer some of these questions, as well, as are any of the other attorneys present who care to defer to them.

So the first question is this, Mr. Giuliani has noted that the Bognet decision's interpretation of standing was based on a future inquiry. Why is that case not distinguishable here where the alleged injury happened in the past? Do you understand my question?

MR. DONOVAN: I do. If I may, Judge, it is for the same reasons Judge Ranjan, that they're together. The reason why is because it isn't the temporal aspect that is the problem there, the issue goes back to is it vote dilution and is it a specific particularized harm.

That was the point about drop boxes and Judge Ranjan in Bognet. It's not the timing, Judge. The question is, is there a general harm that's done to all voters, and when it is, an individual doesn't have standing to assert an Equal Protection Clause. They might have state law remedies, but that's what those cases stand for, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you. The next question is, why 1 2 doesn't the Trump Campaign have standing here? 3 MR. DONOVAN: For a couple reasons. 4 THE COURT: Just sum it up for me again. MR. DONOVAN: Yeah, sure. So first, Judge, they 5 6 don't -- there's no such thing as derivative voting or -- I 7 think he called it, they called it derivative. That doesn't exist, number one. They have to have their own standing. And 8 9 the problem is, they don't have any competitive standing because they -- at least as alleged, and that's what we're 10 dealing with, is the first amended complaint. 11 12 And they also have no standing because, again, I go 13 back to Bognet, they can't actually point to anything that has 14 causation or redressability or the different reasons in your 15 Voter Alliance. I won't go through those different doctrines. But that's why, Judge. 16 17 MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, if I could respond to this. THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 18 MR. GIULIANI: Well, first of all, on dilution or 19 20 denial or the right to vote, the fact is the vote wasn't 21 counted, Your Honor. I can't see what the difference is if I'm not allowed to go into the voting booth and kept out or I go in 22 23 the voting booth and they cancel my vote. 24 The fact is, it's -- the vote wasn't counted. That's 25 a denial of the right to vote, particularly if I lived in

another location in the state, I would have been allowed to vote. That vote would have been counted.

You can't have, in a presidential election, a nationwide election, you can't have two different standards, two different practices, let's say, in different parts of the state. I do precisely the same thing in one part of the state and you count my vote, and I do the same thing in another part of the state and you don't count my vote. And it's almost a distinction without a difference to say, oh, that's dilution rather than denial. The vote didn't get counted; therefore, the vote was denied.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Donovan, next question. Why isn't this injury, either by the campaign or the individual plaintiffs, redressable?

MR. DONOVAN: It's not redressable, Judge, because it comes back to the cases we walked through, that is, the alleged harm that is here, I think as alleged, is that some individuals were able to go vote provisional -- which, by the way, is a standard. It's part of the Election Code, and any voter can go do it. It's actually required by federal law, as well.

But when that happens, Judge, the harm there is the dilution to everyone. So what Judge Ranjan and in your opinion, so assume someone goes and they vote and it is wrong, they shouldn't have voted. Okay? And what those cases stand for is, that is a general harm to the entire statewide tally,

```
not to Mr. Henry, not to Mr. Rogers, not to any campaign,
1
     because as Bognet said then when you look at a campaign is, are
2
     the rules that are out there affecting all candidates, auditor,
3
4
     treasurer, president, and that's what it holds.
              THE COURT: Thank you. Can you explain to me why the
5
6
     Pullman abstention applies in this case?
7
              MR. DONOVAN: Yes, Judge.
              THE COURT: Or should I ask Mr. --
8
9
              MR. DONOVAN: Mr. Aronchick can, if he wants to
10
     take --
              THE COURT: Mr. Aronchick, do you want to take that
11
12
     one up? It's really your wheel --
13
              MR. ARONCHICK: I'll take that one up.
              THE COURT: Yeah.
14
15
              MR. ARONCHICK: Can you hear me?
              THE COURT: Why does Pullman abstention apply in this
16
17
     case?
              MR. ARONCHICK: For the same reason that Judge Ranjan
18
19
     analyzed in that we have a comprehensive Election Code with
     remedies. And Younger is interfering with a remedy or at least
20
21
     allowing a remedy that's chosen to go forward. Pullman is if
     you have comprehensive remedies that are available to you, and
22
     particularly in the context of the presidential election
23
24
     structure that Congress has set up, you need to go to those
25
     remedies, and it's classic, it's classic Pullman.
```

You can go -- and what's happening here in this case is there are ongoing proceedings that they could intervene or at least even raise the issues. Ms. Kerns has already told you that. And there are proceedings that are available to them, i.e. Pullman, that they could then invoke to try to test these issues.

But, Your Honor, just -- I don't want to get off your question, but I wanted to, well, only if it's appropriate, make one other point, only if it's appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, let me, while I've got you there on abstention, I have another question for you --

MR. ARONCHICK: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Aronchick. You've stated that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies because the Trump Campaign has already litigated questions regarding public identification of voters who submitted defective mail-in ballots in, if I understand it, Bucks, Philadelphia, and Northampton Counties.

Did those decisions deal with the notice and cure question at issue here?

MR. ARONCHICK: No. Those particular decisions dealt more generally with ballots that were either counted or not counted based on defects, you know, with a variety of defects that could occur. The Hamm case is the one that deals with the notice and cure issues that was in front of Judge Brobson.

And the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine I didn't -- I don't

think applies yet to even that case because it's pending.

Rooker-Feldman would apply, for example, to Mr. Giuliani's imploring you to cast aside the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's final opinion today about observers. That's a classic

Rooker-Feldman problem. And so I wanted to differentiate that.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. ARONCHICK: The -- okay.

THE COURT: So, well, that's fine. Mr. Aronchick, I think you wanted to add something else now while I've got you here. Why don't you go ahead and do that.

MR. ARONCHICK: Yes. The primary -- you know, this whole notion of notice and cure is being used very loosely.

But to focus in on what they actually alleged in the complaint about Philadelphia is -- in the paragraph I referred to earlier

Election Day and voted provisionally.

And that -- and they say these folks have the ability to do that because the Secretary issued guidance the day before and Philadelphia let voters know that their vote is not on the register of approved voters, and if you want to invoke your rights, you can do that.

is primarily the issue of people who spoiled their ballot on

And in Mr. Giuliani's -- and by the way, it's nothing personal with Mr. Giuliani at all. I'm sorry if he took it that way. It's personal, absolutely not. It's professional about being dismissive of his arguments.

But the point he made he said several times, and I don't expect that he would know the Pennsylvania Election Code, that the idea of voting provisionally, spoiling your ballot and voting provisionally is somehow illegal, that the Secretary made up law, but it's in the code. The sections I cited to you earlier, it's in the law that you can spoil and vote provisionally.

What is important about the standing analysis, aside -- in addition to what Mr. Donovan said, is the traceability issue, because, number one, it's legal to spoil your ballot and vote provisionally.

Number two, it's impossible for them to say that Philadelphia's notice advising voters that they can do so -- first, as I said before, what's wrong with that? I mean, what world are we living in here?

But it's impossible to say that's the reason why any voter went to the polls and spoiled their ballot and voted provisionally. Their own complaint says that this was a gigantic public -- issue in the public. And so I really think it's important to address that point as a matter of standing.

And the final point I just want to make, I'm not going to repeat what Mr. Nkwonta and Mr. Donovan and I already went over about equal protection, but the idea that this is a Marks Stinson case is crazy.

Marks Stinson stands alone in the Third Circuit. The

Bognet decision pretty much said so. There is nothing about this complaint that meets the Marks Stinson facts, and Marks Stinson said nothing about competitive standing. I mean, that's a completely invented notion.

I appreciate that my old and good friend Bruce Marks was in court today, it's nice to see him again after all these years, but it had nothing to do with competitive standing, nothing. I mean, it's not in the opinion.

And what is before you is the Third Circuit law gathered together by Bognet. And if other circuits can say that in the administration of the vote, even if counties are wrong about how they administered it, those kinds of issues are not equal protection. They're just simply not. And thank you for letting me deviate from your question on that one.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. ARONCHICK: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Well, those are my questions, so let's talk about some post-hearing items to address and some other, what I described at the beginning of the argument today as ministerial matters.

First, I think the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to file an opposition brief to the motions to dismiss. That hasn't happened. I'm suggesting by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, November 18th, and you're agreeing with me.

```
MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, again, say that again, I'm
 1
 2
     sorry.
              THE COURT: Well, I mean, we should get, I think, an
 3
     opposition brief from you. I'm willing to take one.
 4
 5
              MR. GIULIANI: Could we have leave to amend now, Your
 6
     Honor?
 7
              THE COURT: This is a brief in opposition to their
     motions to dismiss.
 8
 9
              MR. GIULIANI: Oh.
              THE COURT: I want to give you the chance to brief
10
     that, if you want to do that.
11
12
              MR. GIULIANI: Oh, sure, absolutely.
              THE COURT: So I'm suggesting by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow.
13
              MR. GIULIANI: A brief in opposition to basically what
14
15
     they argued today?
16
              THE COURT: The defense -- well, the defense filed new
17
     motions to dismiss to the amended complaint --
18
              MR. GIULIANI: Yes, of course.
19
              THE COURT: -- that was filed Sunday. But I
20
     understand what your arguments are, but I'm willing to take
21
     it --
              MS. KERNS: I understand what you mean.
22
              THE COURT: -- in written form, as well. So in light
23
24
     of our timeline, I'd suggest -- it doesn't give you quite 24
25
     hours, but by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow, and then the defendants until
```

noon Thursday, which is November 19, to file a reply brief.

I'll issue an order on that, maybe not this evening but
tomorrow morning to confirm it. So a brief in opposition to
the new motion to dismiss.

The first motion to dismiss, of course, is mooted out under the rules with the amended complaint, so don't bother with that. And then the reply, as I said, by noon on Thursday November 19. And I'm sure you'll make that happen somehow or the other.

Now, I also suggest that you consider, plaintiffs really consider whether there should be a new motion for preliminary injunction. There was the initial motion with the initial complaint, but, again, there's now an amended complaint, and technically you probably ought to file a new motion for preliminary injunction.

Can you do that? And I'm suggesting that you be given until 5:00 p.m. tomorrow to do that, as well, which I think under our time frame is doable.

MS. KERNS: Right.

THE COURT: Right? You can redo that from what was done previously, I think, modify that margin, make sure it fits. So both of those things by tomorrow at 5:00. And then I'll give the defendants until 5:00 p.m. Thursday the 19th to respond to that. In doing all of this, I'm looking at Mr. Donovan, but I'm really looking at all of you. And then

the plaintiffs, I'll give you until Friday the -- whatever 1 Friday is, the 20th, November 20, to reply. 2 MS. KERNS: Will this all be in your order? Because 3 I'm not writing. 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. You should write it down, anyway, 6 That's what lawyers do, they write things down. 7 we'll sketch that out. So there will be an order tomorrow morning, maybe later tonight. I think my staff probably wants 8 9 to part for the evening, but at some point I'll dictate an order, probably docketed in the morning. But that, if you 10 wrote it down, that's our time frame. That's what I need, I 11 12 think, in terms of papers. Now, let me talk about these ministerial matters. 13 First, there's a -- I don't think it's been filed, but there's 14 15 a desire, I think, to file a second amended complaint, which Mr. Giuliani --16 17 MR. GIULIANI: Yes, Your Honor, we would ask for leave to do that to clear up the issues today and also to add --18 19 THE COURT: You need to file -- have you filed --20 Mr. Scaringi, I'm looking back at you. Did you file a motion 21 to file a second amended complaint? You filed a motion to 22 continue. I said no on that. But you referenced that, I think. 23 24 MR. SCARINGI: No, we didn't, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCARINGI: We just filed a motion to continue. 1 In our motion to continue, we did express our intent to file --2 THE COURT: You'd like to file. All right. But you 3 need, at this point, to file a motion for the court's approval, 4 and you might get agreement or you might get opposition from 5 the defendants. 6 7 Now, I'm typically not a betting man, occasionally at the track, I would guess that there will be nonconcurrence, but 8 9 I don't know. MR. SCARINGI: Well, we can open up to the floor right 10 11 now. 12 THE COURT: Well, we're going to talk about it at the 13 end because it might resolve all of this for you. I'll take 14 you to dinner. 15 MR. DONOVAN: You're a good better, Judge. 16 THE COURT: Right? 17 MR. DONOVAN: I mean, in all seriousness --THE COURT: A lot of these matters can be cured with a 18 19 drink and dinner, and I've sent counsel out to do just that. 20 I'm not sure this is one of those cases, but hope springs 21 eternal. 22 MR. DONOVAN: It does. Judge, that's just -- I think a couple reasons, Judge. Look, I appreciate the schedule. We 23 24 obviously don't have a hearing on Thursday. You know, hope 25 does spring eternal. I think you're going to dismiss this

```
case. I think the law requires it. We'll do the other
 1
     briefing. But once you dismiss that case, I think then when
 2
     they file this motion, if you permit them -- this is now their
 3
     third time, okay, in an expedited election --
 4
              THE COURT: I don't know whether I'm going to permit
 5
 6
     it.
          I just want to say --
 7
              MR. DONOVAN: Yeah.
              THE COURT: -- they would need to file the motion --
 8
 9
              MR. DONOVAN: I agree.
              THE COURT: -- to do so with concurrence or
10
     nonconcurrence of the defendants. I suspect nonconcurrence
11
12
     will be coming into play here.
13
              MR. DONOVAN: I guess with that, Judge, I don't want
     that to moot out -- we have spent a lot of time, effort, we
14
15
     have a state election to certify, we really want your ruling.
     And I know sometimes -- I guess they're going to file a motion
16
17
     for leave and then we'll brief that.
              THE COURT: Right, well, that's what I'm talking
18
19
     about. But I don't want them to think --
20
              MR. DONOVAN: I gotcha.
21
              THE COURT: -- that I've prejudged, I've decided
     today. I don't want the plaintiffs to think that.
22
              MR. DONOVAN: Understood, understood, Judge.
23
24
              THE COURT: That's what I'm driving at.
25
              MR. DONOVAN: Understood.
```

```
THE COURT: So if you want to send in, in the next day
1
2
     or so, a motion to file, I guess, a second amended complaint,
     I'll take that up and adjudicate it.
3
              MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, may I just clarify just a
4
     little bit? We can file with you a motion for leave by
5
     tomorrow morning. We could also give you the amended complaint
 6
7
     and give them the amended complaint.
              THE COURT: You've got to go through --
8
9
              MR. GIULIANI: I'm told we need until 5 o'clock,
     but --
10
11
              THE COURT: You've got to go through the procedures.
12
     You've got to go back to them, and we've got to go --
              MR. GIULIANI: But the benefit of that would be that
13
     the amended complaint does not differ very, very much from what
14
15
     we've already addressed, with one exception, and that's the due
16
     process count.
17
              THE COURT: You can attach it. I mean, I'll take it
18
     up.
19
              MR. GIULIANI: Okay.
              THE COURT: Mr. Donovan and company will decide how
20
21
     they want to respond.
22
              MR. DONOVAN: Yeah, Judge, I think at this point we'd
     also ask that we don't even have to respond to that, Judge,
23
24
     until we get your ruling on the current motion to dismiss.
25
              THE COURT: That may be, but --
```

```
MR. DONOVAN: I understand what you're telling them.
1
2
     I'm just asking for the --
              THE COURT: I don't want the plaintiffs, or the
 3
     defendants, but particularly the plaintiffs in this instance,
4
     since they're seeking this relief, to think that I've decided
5
 6
     the matter.
                  I've got to --
7
              MR. DONOVAN: Understood.
              MR. SCARINGI: Your Honor --
8
9
              THE COURT: I've got to mull it over, frankly. Yeah.
              MR. SCARINGI: For clarification on the motion seeking
10
     leave to file an amended complaint, the due date would be
11
12
     tomorrow at 5:00 p.m.?
              THE COURT: If that works. I think someone has --
13
     Mr. Giuliani just suggested. That's fine with me. I think you
14
15
     need some time to do it.
              MR. SCARINGI: Yes, yes, Your Honor, we do, yes.
16
17
              MR. DONOVAN: And Judge --
              THE COURT: It's not a lot of time, but I give you --
18
19
     I don't want to say noon tomorrow when you need to go home and
20
     sleep on it and think about how you want to word it. You know,
21
     tomorrow at 5:00 is fine.
22
              MR. SCARINGI: Yes.
              MR. DONOVAN: And, Judge, we would request to not have
23
24
     to respond even to that motion until we complete this briefing
25
     and get your ruling.
```

```
THE COURT: I don't have an objection to that.
1
2
              MR. DONOVAN: Thank you, Judge.
3
              THE COURT: All right. The discovery and the
4
     questions issue, I'll take that under advisement.
5
              Last issue is this, I call it the Kerns versus
6
     Kirkland and Ellis matter. That's my note. So that's --
7
     Ms. Kerns, I listened to the -- I guess it was a voicemail.
                                                                   Is
     that what it was? From somebody. I don't know whether you
8
9
     sent it along or Mr. Donovan sent it along. It doesn't matter.
     I listened to it.
10
              So, all right, so that's bad form. It's not a
11
12
     sanctionable matter. So, Mr. Donovan, I realize this is not
           I realize it's not Kirkland and Ellis, you know,
13
     attending this. But where is this -- is this man, like, in
14
15
     your Abu Dhabi satellite office? You're a big shop. Where was
     it?
16
17
              MR. DONOVAN: Not yet.
              THE COURT: Paris?
18
19
              MR. DONOVAN: No, Judge.
              THE COURT: Does he still work at the firm?
20
21
              MR. DONOVAN: He does, yes.
              THE COURT: Okay. Well, look, you've got to go back
22
     and tell this guy -- I mean, the one thing is, and you've
23
24
     already told him this, I'm sure, whoever the managing partner
25
     is.
```

MR. DONOVAN: In very stern words.

THE COURT: Maybe that's you. Look, you know, this is evident, we -- at least the attorneys would appreciate this. So Ms. Kerns and Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Scaringi and the other attorneys who are involved have every right to represent the Trump Campaign or really anybody they want. They can take up what, in some corridors, I suppose, the professional corridors of Washington, D.C., might, might be an unpopular cause.

Well, you look a couple of rows back at the leader of the NAACP here in Pennsylvania, and you can chat with him on the way out or, better yet, have your associate or whoever he was at Kirkland have a chat with him or his counterpart in Washington. You want to deal with somebody who picks up what might, in some corridors, be an unpopular cause.

Now, I would suggest that representing the Trump Campaign in many corridors is not an unpopular cause. I think there are a lot of people, about half, maybe a little less than half the country by voting population, if we assume that the stats are what they are, think this is exactly the right thing to do. But what's unpopular to somebody is not popular to another.

So he didn't advance the ball forward much with anybody. What you can tell him he did is, he took the time of a very busy Federal District Court judge in Pennsylvania to read the papers, which, of course, I read because I read

everything, listened to this unfortunate voicemail. It just wasted my time.

It's not sanctionable, but it's bad form. And you should have a chat, somebody should have a chat with him about it. You probably already have, and don't do that, don't do that again.

Counsel, I don't know what's going on in this country. These individuals have a right to legal representation of their choice. And it wasn't a threatening call to Ms. Kerns, but it was just -- you know, it was -- you know, she probably, you know, using the term broadly, accurately described it as a harassing call.

So you can convey my disdain back to your man. He's not going to be sanctioned. I'm sure that your people at Kirkland will attend to that --

MR. DONOVAN: You can be assured of that.

THE COURT: -- if you haven't already. And,

Ms. Kerns, I'm very sorry that that happened. I understand

from my staff that you've gotten other calls of that sort and
things. But it's not -- believe me, I've had to sanction a few
attorneys. I don't enjoy it. This is not, in my mind, a
sanctionable issue.

Remember, I'm here for the main event. That's what we dealt with today. These other issues are just -- you know what it is, it's piffle. And I'm just so busy that I've got to deal

with the main event, and spending any more of my time dealing 1 with that -- and I'm sorry that you were affronted by that. I 2 3 mean, at least if this young man at Kirkland and Ellis is not 4 sorry about it, I'm sorry on his behalf, but that's all. MS. KERNS: May I just briefly be heard on it, Your 5 6 Honor? 7 THE COURT: Well, do I need any more than I've already said? 8 9 MS. KERNS: Well, I want the record to be clear that I did not release that voicemail to anyone except this court --10 THE COURT: Yeah. 11 12 MS. KERNS: -- my legal team, and the other side. So 13 to the extent that it gets out, it's not from me. And --THE COURT: Is it out? 14 15 MS. KERNS: Not that I know of, but I want to make that clear on the record. And when that -- because, Your 16 17 Honor, I would not want to rain down on him what has rained down on me. 18 19 And when that call came through, it was more than an 20 inconvenience, because I am getting hundreds of calls, and I'm 21 in danger of missing legitimate communications from Pacer and 22 from opposing counsel. And when the caller ID said Kirkland and Ellis, I 23 24 rightly thought it might be from one of the many, many lawyers 25 on the other side. And it took a lot of time for an attorney

who is representing somebody in federal court to go through that.

And I think what offended me most was that I knew within minutes that it came from Kirkland and Ellis using a Google search to do a reverse lookup, yet when I reached out to Mr. Donovan on Sunday night, he said he had to investigate. I mean, I already knew. He said he had to investigate and it was Sunday night and he would get back to me. And he disagreed with my conclusion that it was Kirkland and Ellis.

And then when I sent him the voicemail that had the caller ID with it, he simply called it discourteous, and he said the lawyer was not on the file or was not a litigator.

And I just felt that that was not a sincere apology. And the smugness and the dismissiveness with which he treated me should not be allowed.

And I've represented now the President of the United States, and I've also represented people in small claims court over hundred-dollar claims, and I've represented the gamut. And this should not happen to any litigant because my time was taken away from this case because of something that happened in Kirkland and Ellis. And I just feel that this should not be allowed.

And I defer to Your Honor about sanctions, and I completely understand your ruling, but I want people to understand how this impacted this case, and that should never

```
be allowed. I don't understand what goes on at Kirkland and
1
     Ellis, I'm not privy to how they train people, but this should
2
3
     absolutely not happen.
              And as we're sitting here today, Mr. Donovan has not
 4
     apologized to me, Kirkland and Ellis has not apologized to me,
5
     and the gentleman whose name I refuse to give out because I
 6
7
     don't want this to rain down on him, he has not made a sincere
     apology, and to me that's a disgrace.
8
 9
              THE COURT: Well, so noted. Now, is there anything
     else for today?
10
              MR. ARONCHICK: Your Honor?
11
              THE COURT: I'll take the matter under advisement.
12
              MR. ARONCHICK: Your Honor, I have a question.
13
     Honor? Your Honor?
14
15
              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. ARONCHICK: Mark Aronchick.
16
17
              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. ARONCHICK: A housekeeping question.
18
19
              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. ARONCHICK: Housekeeping. I believe that all of
20
21
     us that argued -- first of all, I want to thank you for -- you
22
     know, for this lengthy day and the opportunities. I believe
     all the lawyers who argued no doubt are going to be asked by
23
24
     the press to comment, to talk about this hearing.
25
              I have no problem with that one way or another.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
suspect that there are certain people in your courtroom who
will be asked to comment more than others, and that's okay.
just want to know if Your Honor has a problem. In light of
this conversation, it occurs to me. I wanted to ask you if you
have a problem of lawyers, while this is under advisement,
commenting or talking about what happened today, if that
matters to you.
         THE COURT: No.
        MR. ARONCHICK: Okay, I just wanted to be careful.
Okay.
        MR. DONOVAN: Judge, just to clarify, I think you've
already answered it, but there's no hearing on Thursday now?
         THE COURT: I don't think there's a need.
don't think there's a need for a hearing --
        MR. DONOVAN: I agree.
         THE COURT: -- at this juncture.
        MR. DONOVAN: Thank you, Judge.
         THE COURT: And so that, I will note that, as well, in
tomorrow's order that outlines our remaining briefing schedule,
notes that, and I'll take this matter under advisement and
attend to it accordingly. Is there anything else? Yes.
        MR. SCARINGI: Just a couple of last-minute items.
Did you say that you are going to resolve plaintiffs' motion to
compel discovery that's outstanding?
         THE COURT: At some point I'll take care of it, I'll
```

```
take that up.
1
              MR. SCARINGI: And also the motion to quash subpoenas
2
     for certain witnesses?
3
              THE COURT: I loop that altogether as an ongoing
4
5
     discovery issue.
 6
              MR. SCARINGI: And, also, the plaintiffs would like to
7
     file a motion for expedited discovery in this case, for
     additional discovery.
8
9
              THE COURT: Send it in tomorrow by 5:00.
              MR. SCARINGI: Tomorrow by 5:00.
10
11
              THE COURT: If you can do that.
12
              MR. SCARINGI: I think we can, Your Honor.
              MS. KERNS: Your Honor, as you know, my motion to
13
     withdraw is still pending, so --
14
15
              THE COURT: Do you still want to withdraw? Well,
     look --
16
17
              MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor --
              THE COURT: Why don't you do this, are you going to --
18
19
     are you staying over tonight?
20
              MS. KERNS:
                          No.
21
              THE COURT: Heading back in the morning? You don't
     know?
22
              MS. KERNS: No, I'm going to Philadelphia tonight.
23
24
              THE COURT: Why don't you call my staff tomorrow, call
25
     Mrs. Rhinehart, who's my courtroom deputy who is right here,
```

```
and just tell me by midday. Think it over.
1
              MS. KERNS: Okay. I'll discuss it with my client.
2
3
              THE COURT: I wanted you involved, Ms. Kerns, because
     you've really been involved from the beginning.
4
5
              MS. KERNS: I understand.
 6
              THE COURT: And until I had sorted things around with
7
     Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Scaringi, allowed them to get up and settle
     into the case, I thought it was important that you stay
8
9
     involved.
              The Texas attorneys were fine. They hadn't been
10
     involved in the case -- they had only been involved in the
11
     case, I don't know, a day, maybe, and then they were apparently
12
     discharged or whatever happened. But you weren't.
13
                                                          So why
     don't you think about what you want to do.
14
15
              MS. KERNS: I have to discuss it with the client.
              THE COURT: Yes, well, indeed, and you decide yourself
16
17
     what you need to do. But if you want to do that, why don't you
18
     just send in a very short one-page motion singularly for you,
19
     and if that's what your desire is, then let Mrs. Rhinehart know
20
     you're going to do that. I'll take you off immediately.
21
              MS. KERNS: Thank you.
              THE COURT: But mull it over.
22
23
              MS. KERNS: Thank you.
24
              THE COURT: I appreciate your attendance today.
25
     Anything else?
```

```
MR. SCARINGI: Two last very quick questions.
1
              THE COURT: Mr. Scaringi, you've got a lot of these
2
     technical questions.
3
              MR. SCARINGI: On the motion for permission for leave
4
     to amend and file a second amended complaint, may we waive the
5
 6
     local rule requiring concurrence or nonconcurrence among the
7
     defendants considering there are seven?
              MR. DONOVAN: Yes, we'll nonconcur now for you.
8
9
              THE COURT: Yeah, they have an oral nonconcurrence.
     Do all the defendants present agree you will not concur in this
10
     particular motion?
11
          (Affirmative responses from defense counsel.)
12
              THE COURT: All defense counsel --
13
              MR. ARONCHICK: Yes, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: Well, I guess, Ms. Hangley, you're here on
15
     behalf of your --
16
17
              MR. SCARINGI: That would expedite the filing. Thank
     you.
18
              THE COURT: It will.
19
20
              MR. SCARINGI: And considering the state certification
21
     deadline, November 23rd, and the hearing for Thursday being
22
     canceled, postponed, does the court have any idea as to, if the
     motion to dismiss is resolved in our favor, when the hearing
23
24
     would be, the evidentiary hearing?
25
              THE COURT: No. I've got to recalculate that.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

haven't continued it, I've canceled it. If it needs to be rescheduled, you'll know. We'll talk on the phone. I'll convene another telephone conference call with counsel, and we'll set a date as expeditiously as I can. MR. SCARINGI: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Counsel, is there anything else today? MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, I'd like to say one thing on behalf of Ms. Kerns, the reality is, and without going into great detail, she's been under a lot of attack as a result of this case. So the call from the gentleman from Kirkland and Ellis -- and I have not heard the conversation. She hasn't shared it with anyone but you. I mean, it was in the context of the woman needed protection. THE COURT: Well, it wasn't a threatening call. was a call, I would suggest, if I used a word, the word would be "mockery." MR. GIULIANI: But the reason I say it is, I just want you to understand the context in which it took place. THE COURT: No, I --MR. GIULIANI: It's not kind of a mutual situation where you get a call like that and you can evaluate it. situation in which she's been put under extraordinary pressure. And part of the reason for the confusion and the different complaints which I see you noted is because our original counsel also was kind of forced off the case --

```
THE COURT: Well, I --
 1
              MR. GIULIANI: -- because his law firm, because his
 2
     law firm wouldn't allow him to do it, which I think is pretty
 3
 4
     outrageous.
 5
              THE COURT: The press suggested that, but in their
 6
     motion to withdraw, they gave me a more anodyne, you know,
 7
     reason --
              MR. GIULIANI: Yeah. Well, that's not exactly the
 8
 9
     case.
              THE COURT: -- and it isn't for me to speculate. But,
10
     I mean, I think that's regrettable. You should be able to
11
     represent your clients, and that's -- I mean, without, without
12
     difficulty, criticism.
13
14
              Now, this is what I suggest you do. You can -- this
15
     is off the record, by the way, Lori. Thank you.
16
         (Discussion held off the record.)
17
              THE COURT: Thank you, counsel, very much. Court is
18
     adjourned.
19
          (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 7:00 p.m.)
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

I, Lori A. Shuey, Federal Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript to the best of my ability of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-captioned matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, this 21st day of November, 2020.

## /s/ Lori A. Shuey

Lori A. Shuey
Federal Certified Realtime Reporter